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Introduction
The introduction of the euro represented a major change in the monetary policy regime of
several European economies in the last decade. Such a change induces changes in agents’
behaviour. A natural question in this context is whether the common monetary policy has
identical effects in the euro area (EA) member economies once established and if not to what
extent is it different. Furthermore can we observe a convergence towards identical effects? Due
to differences in financial structures of these economies that persisted in the first decade of
the euro there is reason to believe that the monetary transmission has not been homogeneous
in EA member economies.
In the literature several channels along which monetary policy affects the real economy
have been identified. The interest rate channel is the traditional channel of monetary trans-
mission. This channel can be traced back to traditional Keynesian analysis but it is still a
central mechanism in modern macroeconomic models about monetary policy1. A rise in the
money supply will lead to a fall in the real interest rate. As a consequence the user cost
of capital falls, which induces enterprises to increase their investment spending and thereby
raises aggregate demand, leading to an increase in aggregate output. It is however important
to stress that the user cost of capital is in real terms, whereas the interest rate under control
of the monetary authority is nominal. Therefore we must assume some form of price or wage
rigidity to relate nominal interest rates to the user cost of capital. (compare Mishkin 1996)
As was pointed out by Bernanke & Gertler (1995) the effects of an interest rate change by
the monetary authority can be larger than the interest rate elasticities of consumption and
investment and therefore some researchers hold the view that this story is too simple. This
strand of the literature assigns credit markets an important role in the monetary transmission
mechanism.
The so-called credit channel of monetary policy is due to the imperfect information between
lenders and borrowers, which leads to credit frictions. As a consequence there is a gap between
the opportunity cost of using internally generated funds and externally obtainable funds for
investment, the external finance premium. Proponents of the credit view argue that monetary
policy will influence the external finance premium in two ways, through the balance sheet of
firms and bank lending. (Bernanke & Gertler 1995)
The idea of the balance sheet channel is that a tightening of monetary policy will affect
the borrowers’ financial position (net worth), which is the sum of liquid assets and collateral.
(compare for instance Bernanke & Gertler 1989) The stronger a borrower’s financial position,
1Compare for instance Rotemberg & Woodford (1997).
1
2the smaller the potential conflicts of interest with the lender, the smaller the external finance
premium. Fluctuations in financial wealth will thus affect firms’ spending and investment
decisions. Monetary policy can affect the financial position in 3 ways. A direct effect will
be that due to the outstanding debt the borrower has, an increase in interest rates will raise
interest expenditure. Secondly, as rising interest rates are normally associated with declining
asset values, the borrowers’ balance sheets will be weakened. A more indirect effect is that
increases in interest rates will induce the customers of a borrower to decrease their spending,
which will depress the firms’ revenues and thus over time will decrease borrowers’ net worth
and probably creditworthiness. (Bernanke & Gertler 1995)
The bank lending channel focuses on the role of banks in the transmission of monetary
policy. (e.g. Bernanke & Blinder 1988) This channel recognizes banks as the dominant source
of external finance. If the central bank increases its policy interest rate, increases in the costs
of funds for banks will lead to a decrease of the volume of credit supplied to the economy
and therefore raise interest rates at which firms can obtain credit. By how much the lending
rate increases will depend on several factors, namely competition in the banking system,
considerations about how much an increase in interest rates increases the risk of default of
banks’ borrowers as well as bank behaviour in general.
Considering the lifetime earnings of households, the corresponding life-cycle model by
Ando & Modigliani (1963) offers the notion of another transmission channel that stresses the
interrelation of interest rates and asset prices, the so-called wealth channel. A decrease in the
key interest rate of the monetary authority increases the opportunity costs of stocks, bonds
and other assets, thus increasing the households’ wealth and inducing a rise of aggregate
demand. The precise magnitude of the effect depends on the importance of capital markets
and intermediaries.
As most EMU member economies are relatively small the exchange rate channel2 of mon-
etary transmission is yet another important channel in the European context. Consider an
unanticipated decrease in the domestic interest rate. This shock leads to an increase in output
and consumption. If the economy is relatively large the world interest rate falls and the nom-
inal depreciation leads to a decline in the domestic country’s terms of trade. This will induce
foreigners to increase their consumption and therefore the domestic current account will move
into surplus. As a result the domestic country will improve in the allocation of net foreign
assets. In the long run the domestic country’s trade balance will be negative, as the positive
growth in net foreign assets will serve to finance the consumption of domestic residents who
will consume more than is produced domestically. (compare Lane 2001) If the economy is
relatively small the world interest rate will remain unchanged, which means that the decrease
in the domestic price level will lead to a capital outflow until the domestic interest rate is back
to where it started from. The volatility of nominal exchange rates is of considerable impor-
tance in this context for the evolution of real variables such as production and consumption
as the domestic price level is linked to the nominal exchange rate. Therefore a change in
the nominal exchange rate will change the relative price of domestic versus foreign goods.
Bearing this in mind it might be worth considering to eliminate the exchange rate as a source
2see Obstfeld & Rogoff (1995) for a discussion
3of distortion either by fixing it to the most important trading partner (as Austria, Belgium,
the Netherlands and Denmark did with their respective currencies to the German currency
between the 1970s and the 1990s) or joining a monetary union such as the EMU. Eliminating
costs arising from exchange rate volatility by fixing the exchange rates (or joining a monetary
union) might therefore be beneficial in a welfare economic sense. Engel & Rogers (2001) have
however demonstrated that costs associated with joining a monetary union might be as high
as costs stemming from floating exchange rates, as this involves changing the monetary policy
regime.
The financial structure of an economy is the mixture of financial markets and interme-
diaries operating in the economy. Depending on the design of the financial structure, the
different channels of the monetary transmission mechanism will be stronger or weaker.
The basic problem in finance is that investment decisions are made by managers whereas
finance is provided by different persons, the investors, who face the problem of delegating the
investment decision. A financial intermediary provides the way to deal with the problem of
asymmetric information between investors and managers in that she provides the means to
monitor the manager on behalf of the investors. This will work in most cases when all parties
share the belief that the project to be financed is indeed profitable and so desirable to be un-
dertaken. (Diamond 1984) If this is not the case, which is often the case for new technologies,
then markets may be better suited to channel finance from investors to managers.(Allen &
Gale 2000)
One way to classify economies with respect to financial structure is to look at the degree of
bank dominance in credit markets. In a bank-based financial system banks provide substantial
parts of funds to finance companies’ and households’ consumption and investment. As a
consequence banks will also heavily influence primary and secondary markets, i.e. share and
bond markets. It is therefore clear that the external finance premium, which has to be paid
to obtain external funds on the market, will be larger than that to obtain funds via a bank
loan. In market-based economies on the other hand the main source of funds for consumption
and investment is the capital market. Banks and other financial intermediaries play a rather
subordinate role. As the market plays the major role, the gap between external finance premia
of bank and market financing activities will be smaller than in bank-based systems.
Even though the bank versus market based approach might have some appeal it is probably
not the best way to describe a financial system by these relationships, as the relationships
themselves might be subject to change over time. A more recent approach focuses much more
on the behaviour of economic agents and is the so called Arm’s Length versus Relationship-
based approach.
Relationship-based and Arm’s length refer to two extremes in the spectrum of financing
investment and consumption. A relationship-based system is close to what was above described
a bank-based system, where a financial intermediary acquires some informational advantage
over the market by establishing a relationship to the debtor. Attaining a dominant position
over the debtor, the lender (e.g. a banking institution) can establish some kind of power
over the debtor. This is motivated by her desire to make sure of receiving the expected
return from the credit. The necessary condition for this form of relationship is the presence
4of market entry barriers. These create a monopolistic credit market regime, which induces
welfare losses. (compare Rajan & Zingales 2003) Arm’s length finance on the other hand
enables the borrower to set up relationship to multiple lenders, as there is more information
available to each individual lender. This form of financial system usually occurs in deep
financial markets with low barriers to entry. As there is more transparency, problems related to
asymmetric information will exist onlyto a minor extent. Thus, borrowers have more incentives
to publish information and market prices and interest rates will reflect this information.(Rajan
& Zingales 2003) The presence of less informational asymmetry will therefore reduce the
benefits of monitoring by financial intermediaries.
Financial structures of European economies have changed considerably over the last 15
years, which is to a large part driven by initiatives related to the establishment of the common
currency. Enhanced financial integration could already be observed in the second half of the
1990s. Hartmann, Maddaloni & Manganelli (2003) indicate that prior to the introduction of
the common currency, corporations wishing to issue debt in another European country had to
consult an investment bank with experience in that respective country. After the introduction
they claim that investment banking became increasingly contestable with the result that
underwriting fees declined considerably toward that in the US corporate bond market and
was almost halved. Government bond markets declined in importance as a result of the
stability and growth pact. By eliminating exchange rate risk along with a higher degree of
homogeneity the euro further increased the substitutability of government debt and intensified
the competition in this market. However government bond markets appear to a certain extent
less integrated than that for corporates. Around 2000 government bond yields in the euro
area had converged and spreads of yields vis-a-vis German bonds stayed close to zero until
2008 when, as a consequence of the economic and financial crisis, spreads started to rise again.
In equity markets, Fratzscher (2002) argued that stock market movements had synchronised
in the late 1990s and European equity markets have increased in importance globally. The
reduced exchange rate risk and convergent interest rates were the main explanations for this
increase in financial market integration.
Banking is of great importance especially in the European economies. Since the early
1990s until 2001 however only a few cross-country mergers could be observed (compare
Schmidt 2001) so that the owners of European banks remained national in most cases. Fur-
thermore in most economies country-specific banking structures, such as loan cooperatives
and savings banks in some EMU economies like France, Germany, Austria and Finland, were
preserved (compare Ehrmann, Gambacorta, Sevestre & Worms 2003) until 2003 displaying
no tendency to a higher degree of homogeneity. For most EMU economies a trend towards
more concentration could be observed, with a relatively large variation in market shares of
the largest banking institutions in individual member countries, as figure 1 displays. In Lux-
embourg and Germany we could observe a share of the five largest banks in total assets of
all banks of around 20 %, whereas in Finland and the Netherlands a share of around 80 %
could be observed. It should be noted, that the share of the x largest banks is not a good
measure of the degree of competition in the banking market, as it ingnores the threat of new
entrants. It is quite likely that entry barriers were essentially reduced in the 1990s due to
5Sources: ECB (2004),ECB (2010), own illustration.
Figure 1: Share of five largest credit institutes in total assets of all banks, selected years
European legislation and that the number of potential competitors in the banking markets
of the single member states increased. Looking at other indicators, there is evidence that
competition in EA banking increased. Cross-border interbank lending activity has increased
considerably since the introduction of the common currency. Also cross-border retail lend-
ing activity has increased, it is however still at a low level compared to interbank lending.
(compare OECD 2009)
What are general effects of financial structures on the transmission of monetary policy?
This dissertation tries to provide an answer to this question. The first article in chapter 1
compares the transmission of the common monetary policy to the real economy in selected
EA economies in the first decade of the euro. As in general agents’ response to shocks will
have changed we also study reactions in these economies to exogenous inflation and output
shocks.
An increase in competition in the EA banking sector due to the introduction of a common
currency will certainly have an impact on the degree to which monetary impulses are passed
on to companies and individuals. Therefore we would expect to see different speeds of interest
rate pass-through before and after the establishment of the common currency inside, but not
outside the EA. This lies at the centre of attention of the second article in chapter 2.
6In relationship - based financial structures informational asymmetries are likely to be less
pronounced than in arms’s-length systems. As Gertler & Gilchrist (1993) argue the credit
channel is very important for companies with no alternatives to bank credits as a source of
external funds. The deeper a stock or bond market is, the more firms will have access to it,
and thereby the less firms will depend on bank credits only as a source of (external) funds.
Therefore due to the increase in integration of EA financial markets we would expect that
more companies in EMU member countries have access to different sources of funds which
might decrease the importance of banks in credit markets. As a consequence the transmission
of common monetary policy impulses could have become more homogeneous in credit markets.
Furthermore the wealth channel and its importance might vary as well in different financial
systems. In the last ten years for instance households’ asset holdings became increasingly
diversified, in most economies of the EA, household wealth in bank deposits declined but
still remains at levels above those observed in the US or the UK. The notable exception are
Austria and Greece, where bank deposits still represent more than 50% of total assets.(see
OECD 2009) As monetary policy affects assets held in banks (such as deposits), shares of
companies and debt certificates of governments and companies differently, these differences
in the composition of household wealth will affect consumption and investment decisions
differently in EMU economies. In a relationship-based economy fewer assets will be traded
in the capital market and subsequently, due to the higher monopoly power of banks, returns
on these assets will be lower, as well as the liquidity in the market. Thus, the better access
of firms to deeper (European) financial markets will change firms’ decisions how they finance
their investments. The last paper in chapter 3 studies credit markets in small EMU members
in the first decade of the euro. Focusing on small EMU members has the benefit that we
do not have to account additionally for structural changes in the EA monetary transmission
mechanism, as every single small EA member will only have a negligible impact on the EA as
a whole. Instead, we can focus on deviations from the EA as a whole. This paper presents a
framework to disentangle credit supply and credit demand effects taking the financial structure
of these economies into account.
Chapter 1
Same policy, different effects?
Evidence on the output effects of
monetary policy on selected EA
countries after the introduction of
the euro
1.1 Introduction
The financial and economic crisis in the last two years hit the European economies differently.
Whereas France and Italy has not been affected severely, Germany has been hit more strongly
by the global downturn in trade, Ireland and Spain moreover have been affected by the bursting
of their real estate market bubbles. Against this background the European central bank had
to react to a weighted average development of the euro area, as it is not allowed to react to
developments in single member states by its statutes. As a reaction to the global economic
and financial crisis it took extraordinary measures to battle the effects of the global downturn
on the euro area. The question is whether this single same measure for all economies affected
them in the same way or not.
Before the start of phase 3 of EMU in 1999 the effects of monetary policy in the EA
member states had been subject to discussion. Some authors emphasized the potential asym-
metric nature of the future monetary policy effects (BIS (1994), Locarno, Morgan, Van Els &
Villetelle (2001), Cechetti (1999), Mihov & Scott (2001)), while others emphasized that the
evidence would be against asymmetric effects (compare Mojon & Peersman (2001), Ciccarelli
& Rebucci (2002) and Clausen & Hayo (2002)). All these approaches share a common feature
in estimating individual country models with pre-euro data. Therefore these models measure
relationships between macroeconomic variables that where determined in a monetary policy
regime different to that of the ECB. Even though it has been argued that ECB monetary
policy closely resembles that of the Bundesbank before, it can be argued that for some of the
7
8original EA-11 members, like Italy and Spain, the start of phase 3 of EMU meant some serious
policy regime shift, which had an impact on the behaviour of agents in all economies. This
means that reactions to and of monetary policy observed prior to the euro will have changed
after the introduction of the euro, thus these prior studies will be of limited significance. So
far no follow up of theses studies have been published considering the euro period data only.
This article studies the effects exogenous and endogenous shocks in the euro area as a
whole and compares them to the effects in selected euro area countries after the introduction
of the euro. This reflects the view, that not only the reaction of macroeconomic aggregates
to monetary policy has potentially changed but also the response to exogenous shocks such
as commodity price shocks and global demand shocks as well as domestic shocks. Domestic
shocks still remain an important source of fluctuations since fiscal policy is conducted on the
national level and will affect the euro area aggregate depending on the weight of the respective
economy for the euro area. Furthermore due to the elimination of exchange rate risk, euro
area wide developments have become more important for the individual euro area countries.
This especially applies to small members of the common currency area, but also to the bigger
economies such as Germany, France and Italy. It should therefore be distinguished between
asymmetries in the euro area that arise from asymmetric effects of the common monetary
policy and asymmetric reactions to common macroeconomic shocks.
This article is organized as follows: Section 1.2 discusses three major impacts of establish-
ing the EMU on the effects of monetary policy in its member states. Section 3.4 introduces
the model, section 3.5 discusses the results, section 1.5 concludes.
1.2 Will the establishment of EMU lead to symmetry effects
of monetary policy in its member states?
As already outlined, establishing a monetary union potentially has three major effects on the
individual member states, the elimination of exchange rate risk, the integration of financial
markets and a change in the monetary policy regime.
The elimination of exchange rate risk should reduce trade costs between the members of
the monetary union. As costs of trade decrease, trade itself will be fostered leading to an
intensified integration of markets as already pointed out by Rose (2000) and Rose (2001),
which might lead to a harmonisation in the common currency area business cycle. This
substantial increase in trade, as originally postulated in Rose’s (2000) article is due to the idea
that firms increase their exports to other member states and/or the number of exporting firms
themselves increases. In subsequent studies this effect was found to be lower than originally
argued by Rose (2000), but still large. (compare for an overview De Grauwe & Mongelli 2005)
It is however also not clear whether we should observe more synchronous business cycle
movements. Eickmeier & Breitung (2006) for example observe for some peripheral EA member
states (Greece and Portugal) a lower business cycle correlation than for the EA core and new
EU member states which are not EA members for output and inflation. Their analysis also
suggests that output and inflation linkages have not changed between member states in the
9initial five years after the adoption of the euro. Euro area-wide movements seem to explain
movements in inflation and output in the individual member states to varying degrees.
Financial integration is yet another important area where the common currency has a
considerable effect. Prior to the launch of the common currency restrictions for cross-border
transactions and holdings were gradually eliminated and a single payment system was estab-
lished to foster the euro-area wide provision of financial services and to enhance competition in
financial services. There is evidence that European financial markets have become more inte-
grated before, during and after the introduction of the common currency (compare Adjaoute
& Danthine (2003)). Four years after the introduction of the euro, Hartmann et al. (2003)
detected evidence for considerable integration in euro area government bond markets and
the money markets. Also corporate bonds markets seemed to have integrated, with foreign
competition setting in and underwriting fees declining. Regarding equity markets, already
in the first years of the euro mergers and consolidation of the national stock markets gained
momentum, continuing developments observed by Fratzscher (2002), who found evidence for
integration in euro area equity markets already before the launch of the common currency.
According to the euro area report of the OECD in 2009, integration in the wholesale banking
sector has increased considerably in EA countries, whereas cross-border lending activity in
retail banking is however still low. (OECD 2009)
Apart from exchange rate risk and financial integration the third reason why the effects of
monetary policy might have changed is due to the fact that the monetary policy regime itself
changed. Whereas monetary policy in the EA countries was conducted on a national basis
prior to the introduction of the common currency, after 1998 it was conducted by a single
monetary policy for the euro area as a whole. Furthermore the policy preferences of the ECB
are likely to be different to some central banks in individual member countries previously.
Ciccarelli & Rebucci (2006) investigate whether policy reaction functions in the four major
economies of the EMU were different prior to the introduction of the common currency and
whether they changed over time. The Deutsche Bundesbank is generally considered to be
the predecessor of the ECB due to similar policy objectives and targets. Therefore using the
Bundesbank as a benchmark Ciccarelli & Rebucci find that the French central bank acted
as a follower of Bundesbank policy whereas the Italian and Spanish central banks were less
committed to the EMS and also attached a higher weight to the output gap than to inflation.
Boivin, Giannoni & Mojon (2008) show that changes in the European transmission mechanism
can also be explained by a shift in monetary policy towards a more aggressive response to
output and inflation.
Empirical studies on monetary policy transmission in the individual member states of the
euro area using data prior to 1999 potentially mismeasure the effects after the introduction of
the euro. It is also questionable whether using data prior to the euro will have any relevant
information on the issue in the light of the Lucas critique, when the change in the policy regime
is not accounted for properly. This study therefore only uses data after the introduction of
the euro to assess the impact of monetary policy as well as individual country and aggregate
euro area shocks. Aside from the effects of a common monetary policy shock, this paper also
considers the effects of a common aggregate demand and price shocks. The euro area could
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also be subject to individual country aggregate demand and price shocks as a result of national
fiscal policy (such as a change in VA taxes of national stimulus programs). Depending on the
economic weight of the respective economy for the euro area aggregate these shocks will have
an impact on the monetary union level and therefore affect the decisions of the ECB. If the
economy is small the shocks will either be absorbed domestically or are even not important at
all as euro area developments will counterbalance these, otherwise these shocks will also have
an impact on the other members on the euro area. Thus this article studies the impact of
several types of shocks, common euro area shocks, idiosyncratic country shocks and exogenous
shocks. We investigate the impact of a common aggregate demand a common price and a
common monetary policy shock. Furthermore we investigate the impact of an idiosyncratic
aggregate demand and an idiosyncratic price shock.
This article is related to the empirical literature on the transmission of monetary policy in
Europe and the US, that builds mainly on data prior to 1998, namely standard SVARs (e.g.
Bernanke & Mihov 1998, Bernanke & Mihov 1998, Mihov & Scott 2001, Ehrmann 1998, Mojon
& Peersman 2001) to name only a few.
Furthermore we are interested in the transmission of exogenous and euro area wide shocks
to individual members of the euro area, which has recently been studied in so-called factor-
augmented VAR (FAVAR) models (e.g. Bernanke, Boivin & Eliasz 2005, Eickmeier 2006,
Eickmeier & Breitung 2006, Boivin et al. 2008). This strand of the literature identifies common
EA factors and studies their impact on output and inflation in individual countries. In contrast
to this literature this paper analyses the impact of euro area output and inflation shocks to
individual countries’ output and inflation directly, because this is main focus of economic
policy making of the ECB. In addition the euro area can be hit by idiosyncratic country
shocks: at least for the large countries, output and inflationary developments have a non-
negligible impact on the euro area aggregate and therefore on the decisions of the ECB.
Leaving out the measurable effects and sources of fluctuations therefore is only telling a part
of the story, even though it is clear that the ECB draws on a much larger information set in
the formulation of its policy, as suggested by the FAVAR literature.
1.3 Estimation and Simulation
The structure of the empirical euro area model is defined by an output equation, an inflation
equation and an interest rate equation, similar to the framework in Rudebusch & Svensson
(2002). It is augmented by two further equations, an output and an inflation equation, for
every EA member country to capture different output and inflation developments for the
individual country vis-a-vis the euro area aggregate. Idiosyncratic shocks to output and
inflation are allowed to affect the euro area aggregates only for the three major economies of
the euro area, Germany, France and Italy and will therefore (at least indirectly) be relevant
for decisions at the ECB level.
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1.3.1 The model
The euro area is characterised by three equations. The first equation describes the euro area
output gap change as a function of past changes of the output gap, past changes in euro area
inflation and past interest rate changes, controlling for changes in the US output gap and
changes in oil price inflation. Furthermore changes in the euro area output gap will depend
on innovations to the output gap and innovations to the output gap of the three major euro
area countries (Germany, France and Italy).
∆y˜ea,t = bea,1νea,1,t + b4,iνi,1,t + αea,11∆y˜it−1 + αea,12∆piit−1 + . . .
. . .+ αea,13∆it−1 + d1,ea∆Xt (1.1)
where ∆ is the difference operator (quarter on quarter), y˜ea,t is the euro area output gap,
piit−1 is euro area inflation1, it−1 is a short term money market interest rate, d1,ea is a 3 × 1
coefficient vector, Xt = [ιt, y˜us,t, pio,t] is a matrix containing a constant, the US output gap
(y˜us,t) and annual oil price inflation (pio,t), νea,1,t is an innovation to the output gap of the
euro area and νi,1,t is an innovation to a euro area members’ output gap.
Changes in euro area inflation are explained by past changes in the output gap of the
euro area, past changes in inflation and past changes to the interest rate, contemporaneous
changes in the US output gap and to the oil price inflation, innovations to euro area inflation,
innovations to the euro area output gap and innovations to large individual countries’ inflation.
∆piea,t = bea,2νea,1,t + bea,3νea,2,t + b5,iνi,2,t + αea,21∆y˜ea,t−1 + . . .
. . .+ αea,22∆piea,t−1 + αea,23∆it−1 + d2,ea∆Xt+ (1.2)
where all variables and operators are defined as above, νea,2,t are innovations to euro area
inflation and νi,2,t are large countries’ inflation.
Finally the interest rule of the ECB is given by
∆it = becb,1νea,1,t + becb,2νea,2,t + becb,3νecb,t + αecb,1∆y˜ea,t−1 + . . .
. . .+ αecb,2∆piea,t−1αecb,3∆it−1 + decb∆Xt (1.3)
where νecb,t is an unexpected idiosyncratic shock to the interest rate. This monetary policy
rule differs from that found in the literature as neither the contemporaneous output gap nor
the inflation rate of the euro area enters simultaneously, but shocks to these variables. As we
have a difference equation this should be sufficient since the ECB will likely react to shocks
that change the output gap and inflation.
1log-change in the HCPI with respect to the same quarter last year
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In matrix notation the submodel for the euro area is given by ∆y˜ea,t∆piea,t
∆it
 = Aea(L)
 ∆y˜ea,t∆piea,t
∆it
+
 bea,1 0 0bea,2 bea,3 0
becb,1 becb,2 becb,3

 νea,1,tνea,2,t
νecb,1,t
+Dea∆Xt
where L is the lag-operator. More compactly this can be written as
∆yea,t = cea +Aea(L)∆yea,t +Beaνea,t +Dea∆Xea,t (1.4)
Every member state is characterised by two further equations, an output gap equation
and an inflation equation. The output equation is specified as follows:
∆y˜i,t = b1,iν1,it + αi,1∆y˜it−1 + αi,12∆piit−1 + . . .
. . .+ αi,13∆y˜ea,t−1 + αi,14∆piea,t−1 + αi,15∆it−1 + d1,i∆Xt (1.5)
where all variables and operators are defined as above, y˜i,t is the country’s output gap, pii,t
is the country’s annual inflation rate, d1,i = (c1,i, d1,1,i, d1,2,i) is a 1× 3 coefficient vector and
νi,1,t is an idiosyncratic shock to country i’s output gap.
The country inflation equation is given by
∆piit = bi,2ν1,it + b3,iν2,it + bea,iνea,t + αi,21∆y˜it−1 + αi,22∆piit−1 + . . .
. . .+ αi,23∆y˜ea,t + αi,24∆piea,t + αi,25∆it−1 + d2,i∆Xt (1.6)
where all variables are defined as above, νi,2,t is an idiosyncratic shock to country i’s inflation
rate (change) d2,i = (c2,i, d2,1,i, d2,2,i) is a 1× 3 coefficient vector and νea,t is an innovation to
the euro area output gap.
The country model for every EA member is thus given by
∆yi,t = Ai(L)∆yi,t +Biνi,t +Di∆Xt (1.7)
with yi,t = (y˜i,t, pii,t, y˜ea,t, piea,t, it)′, νi,t = (νi,1,t, νi,2,t, νea,1,t, νea,2,t, νecb,1,t)′, Xt as defined
above and
Bi =

bi,1 0 0 0 0
bi,2 bi,3 bea,i 0 0
b4,i 0 bea,1 0 0
0 b5,i bea,2 bea,3 0
0 0 becb,1 becb,2 becb,3
 , Ai =

αi,11 αi,12 αi,13 αi,14 αi,15
αi,21 αi,22 αi,23 αi,24 αi,25
0 0 αea,11 αea,12 αea,13
0 0 αea,21 αea,22 αea,23
0 0 αecb,1 αecb,2 αecb,3

The major difference between small and large EA member countries is that small countries’
output and inflation shocks don’t affect the EA’s output gap and price level respectively, i.e.
b4,i = b5,i = 0. Note that this system allows output gap and inflation shocks of individual
member states to influence ECB decisions even though ECB policy is not allowed to react to
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developments in single EA member economies. But in fact a German output gap shock will
implicitly influence ECB decisions, as this shock will likely have an impact on the euro area’s
output gap and inflation.
1.3.2 Specification and estimation
Models (1.4) and (1.7) are estimated and then simulated separately to compare the responses
to shocks to the individual variables.
All parameters are estimated using a FGLS (EGLS) procedure. This involves estimating
the reduced form of the model first, which is done by OLS. The reduced form of the model is
obtained by specifying a relationship between the structural innovations (νt) and the errors
of the reduced form (t) which is for this model given by
t = Bνt
Given the OLS estimates of the system (Aˆ(L), Dˆ and cˆ) we can obtain an estimate for
matrix B, i.e. Bˆ, which allows us to decompose the reduced form VC-matrix (Σˆ) of the
system (BΣB′).
To obtain impulse response functions for the shocks of the system we transform models
(1.4) and (1.7) into their structural VMA form,
∆yt = c+
∞∑
i=0
Θexo,i∆Xt−i +
∞∑
i=0
Θiνt−i
which yields the following impulse response functions
Θ0 = B, Θ1 = A1Θ0, Θ2 = A1Θ1 +A2Θ0, . . . ( for shocks to endogenous variables)
Θ0 = B ∗D, Θ1 = A1Θ0, Θ2 = A1Θ1 +A2Θ0, . . . ( for exogenous shocks)
1.4 Results
1.4.1 Data
Data on the output gaps, inflation rates, oil prices at quarterly frequency of all countries were
obtained from the economic outlook database of the OECD from 1995:1 - 2009:2. All data are
in quarter/quarter level-differences. The interest rates of the ECB on a quarterly frequency
were obtained from Eurostat 1999:1 - 2009:2. Interest rates enter the VARs in quarter/quarter
differences. Details on the interest rates are shown in the appendix.
Due to data availability2 we could only estimate the country model specified in equation
2The OECD publishes quarterly output gaps only for six EA countries, i.e. Germany, France, Italy, Finland,
Ireland and the Netherlands. We also tried to estimate country models for all euro area members using
HP-filtered series of real GDP, but the results we obtained were mostly counter-intuitive form an economic
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(1.7) for a subset of the euro area. The estimation period is 1999:1 - 2008:4, which means we
can only work with 40 observations3. We use the AIC criterion to obtain the lag length for
each country pair (compare table 1.8) and the interest rule of monetary policy individually.
1.4.2 General Observations
Figure 1.2 displays the results of the EA submodel. The first column of graphs displays the
effects of a one s.d. shock to the EA output gap. We find that inflation increases following an
unanticipated shock to the EA output gap that also induces the ECB to increase its policy
rate. As a consequence the output gap narrows again which, after a lag leads to a decrease
in inflation.
The second column of graphs displays the effects of an unanticipated shock to the inflation
rate, which leads to a negative output gap. The ECB reluctantly lowers eventually the interest
rate as inflationary pressures decrease, which all together boots aggregate demand leading to
a reduction in the output gap, which is finally closed.
The third column displays the effects of an unanticipated increase in the ECB policy rate.
This leads to a negative output gap, which drives down inflation. This again boost aggregate
demand, which closes the output gap again leading to an increase in inflation again back to
the level before the monetary policy shock. Overall we find an response pattern to a monetary
shock that is similar to those observed in the literature.
1.4.3 The effects of monetary policy
The last column of graphs in figures 1.2 - 1.8 display the effect of a one sd. increase in the ECB
interest rate on the euro area output gap, the individual country output gaps as well as euro
area and national inflation rates. In the individual country system plots the effects on output
and inflation are displayed in the two first graphs in the last column. Table 1.1 compares the
maximal output and inflation effects between the euro area and the six economies.
The output gap in the euro area immediately decreases in the euro area and four of the
six economies. We observe similar patterns for most of the economies over time, and also the
maximal output gap effect after about 12 quarters. For Germany we observe a significantly
higher impact of the interest rate shock compared to the euro area aggregate as well as in
comparison to the other economies.
For inflation we observe for Germany, Finland and Ireland an almost immediate decline in
inflation. The effects for the euro area are similar to those of Germany and Finland, whereas
for Ireland we can observe a stronger effect of an interest rate increase. For France, Italy and
the Netherlands we first observe an increase in the rate of inflation, with a gradual decline
over the first 20 quarters.
perspective.
3Even though it might be problematic in terms of robustness of results, given the number of parameters we
estimated, we hold the view that this exercise is nevertheless interesting. Furthermore, as already mentioned, it
is questionable whether including information prior to 1999 would yield more benefits than problems in terms
of having to account for the regime shift.
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output gap inflation
low p.e. high quarter low p.e. high quarter
EA -0.0089 -0.57 -0.22 12 -0.43 -0.24 -0.03 18
DE -0.96 -1.17 -2.17 13 -0.23 -0.33 -0.57 14
FR -0.52 -0.27 -0.27 14 0.13 0.19 0.41 8
IT -1.07 -0.54 -0.37 12 0.02 0.08 0.18 5
FI -1.14 -0.39 -0.05 12 -0.76 -0.33 -0.01 10
IRE 0.36 0.56 1.18 2 -1.84 -1.13 -0.87 7
NL - - - - 0.25 0.33 0.61 4
Notes: one s.d. shock to the interest rate corresponds to an increase of the
interest rate of 0.11 (EA: 0.14) percentage points; p.e. = point estimate;
high (low) is the upper (lower) bound of the 90 % bootstrapped Hall Confidence
Interval; own estimation.
Table 1.1: Maximal effects of a monetary shock, in percentage points
Overall we can also observe that the timing of the maximal effects for four of the six
economies in terms of the output gap is very similar to the timing of the euro area. On the
other hand the timing of the effects of monetary policy on inflation is different, only Germany
displays a comparable pattern to that of the euro area as a whole, probably also reflecting
the importance of the German economy for the euro area as a whole.
In a meta-study on the effectiveness of monetary in the euro area and the US, De Grauwe
& Costa Storti (2005) find that in the short run the median output effect of monetary policy
of 81 studies is about -0.28 % ranging between -0.91 % and 0.61 %. The results of this study
indicates a close to the median effect for the euro area, a slightly lower than medium effect
for France, Italy and Finland and a considerably large effect for Germany. Also note that the
result for Ireland is still within the range of these studies. Regarding inflation they summarise
the median short run effect of monetary policy to be around -0.07%, ranging between -0.81%
and 0.44%. Our result indicate a stronger effect for the euro area, Germany, Finland and most
notably Ireland. The results for France Italy and the Netherlands is still within the range of
these previous studies.
1.4.4 Euro area-wide and exogenous Shocks
Euro area-wide shocks
This subsection studies the effects of an euro area output gap shock as well as an euro area
inflation shock on output and inflation in the euro area as a whole as well as in its members.
The response of inflation and the ECB interest rate to an euro-area output gap shock is
displayed in the first column figure 1.2 in the appendix. The euro area output gap shock
fades out after about 10 quarters in the euro area. This results in inflationary pressures which
leads to a rise in euro area inflation picking up with some time lag, the maximum effect can
be observed after about 12 quarters. As the output gap shock exerts inflationary pressures
the ECB reacts accordingly and raises interest rates quickly to halt and reverse inflationary
developments.
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output gap inflation
low p.e. high quarter low p.e. high quarter
EA 0.72 1.04 0.0141 6 0.72 1.03 1.37 12
DE 1.11 1.54 0.029 8 0.17 0.25 0.57 7
FR 0.42 0.5 0.0098 4 1.44 1.67 2.97 14
IT 1.37 1.24 0.0255 6 0.21 0.37 0.84 15
FI 1.37 1.46 0.0216 5 0.43 0.88 1.84 12
IRE 0.78 1.17 0.022 5 - - - -
NL 0.43 0.66 0.0121 6 1.67 2.61 4.37 17
Notes: one s.d. shock to the EA output gap corresponds to an increase of the
output gap by 0.29 (EA: 0.35) percentage points; p.e. = point estimate;
high (low) is the upper (lower) boundof the 90 % bootstrapped Hall Confidence
Interval; own estimation.
Table 1.2: EA Output gap shock
The effects in the individual EA members can be compared in the top two graphs in the
middle column of figures 1.3 - 1.8. This euro area-wide output shock leads to an expansion of
the output gap of all the member states and inflationary pressures for all euro area members
(except Ireland). We can observe - similar to the developments in the euro area - the maximal
effect on the output gap after about 5 - 8 quarters. For Germany and Italy we can observe
that the effects appear to be larger than for the euro area as a whole, whereas the effects
seem to be smaller in the other economies. Inflationary pressures stemming from a euro area
demand shock appear to be smaller compared to the whole euro area in case of Germany and
Italy, whereas for France and the Netherlands we observe stronger inflation effects.
output gap inflation
low p.e. high quarter low p.e. high quarter
EA -1.195 -1.42 -1.01 13 0.26 0.42 0.53 6
DE -0.54 -0.17 -0.12 3 -0.34 -0.06 -0.03 1
FR 0.22 0.27 1.23 9 0.12 0.2 0.53 1
IT -1.63 -0.67 -0.26 10 - - - -
FI -2.5 -1.55 -1.29 12 0.16 0.31 0.6 5
IRE -1.64 -0.92 -0.5 6 0.17 0.23 0.4 0
NL -2.78 -1.61 -1.27 13 0.71 0.99 1.64 8
Notes: one s.d. shock to the EA inflation rate corresponds to an increase of the
inflation rate by 0.17-0.19 (EA: 0.22, DE: 0.08, FR: 0.01) percentage points;
p.e. = point estimate; high (low) upper is the (lower) bound of the 90 %
bootstrapped Hall Confidence Interval; own estimation.
Table 1.3: Euro Area Inflation Shock
The response of the euro area output gap and the ECB interest rate to an euro area
inflation shock is displayed in the middle column of figure 1.2 in the appendix. Similar to
an euro area-wide output gap shock a euro area-wide inflation shock dies out after about 10
quarters. The euro area output gap starts to decline immediately and starts to rise again after
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about 12 quarters. The ECB keeps interest rates unchanged for about six to eight quarters
and reacts to the decline in the output gap to stabilise the economy as a whole by lowering
interest rates, considering the transitory nature of this shock not being a threat to the overall
EA price level in the longer run.
The effects in the individual EA members can be compared in the top two graphs in the
fourth column of figures 1.3 - 1.8. For the small EA member countries there are apparently
significant inflationary pressures, whereas the large euro area members appear to be only
insignificantly affected by the euro area shock. The transmission of the euro area inflation
shock to the individual member countries appear instantaneous and also die out quickly. The
effect on the members’ output gaps seem to occur to be faster in Germany and Ireland than
in the remaining euro area countries.
Exogenous shocks
This subsection focuses on the effects of exogenous shocks with special interest in the direct
instantaneous impact. The instantaneous response of the endogenous variables of the system
depends on two types of coefficient matrices, matrix B specifying the contemporaneous effects
of endogenous shocks to the system and matrix D specifying the instantaneous effect of
the exogenous disturbances. Given the information above it suffices to check differences in
instantaneous coefficient matrices to see whether exogenous shocks will have the same or a
different impact on inflation, the output gap in the euro area and its members as well as the
reaction of the ECB. Table 1.4 displays the estimated coefficients of the coefficient matrices
D.
output gap inflation
d1,1 d1,2 d2,1 d2,2
euro area 0.159 0.003 0.035 0.016***
(0.147) (0.004) (0.092) (0.002)
ecb 0.144** 0.001 0.144** 0.001
(0.070) (0.002) (0.070) (0.002)
de 0.216 0.005 -0.146 0.015***
(0.214) (0.005) (0.108) (0.003)
fr 0.305** 0.002 0.2* 0.019***
(0.131) (0.003) (0.113) (0.003)
it 0.121 -0.004 -0.043 0.009***
(0.125) (0.003) (0.079) (0.002)
fi 0.404* 0.007 -0.106 0.015***
(0.231) (0.006) (0.124) (0.003)
ire 1.227* 0.011 -0.161 0.018***
(0.667) (0.016) (0.141) (0.004)
nl 0.081 0.012*** 0.201** 0.002
(0.167) (0.004) (0.101) (0.003)
Notes: ***, **, * indicates significant at the 1, 5, 10 % level,
standard errors in parentheses; own estimation.
Table 1.4: Exogenous shocks
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Interestingly, a shock to annual oil price inflation exerts similar inflationary pressures
in the euro area and its member countries (coefficient d2,2 in the inflation equations). The
ECB reacts significantly to foreign demand shocks (proxied by the US output gap change)
significantly, even though it only affects the French, the Finnish and Irish output gap positively
and leads to inflationary pressures as a consequence. Finally an increase in oil price inflation
positively affects the Dutch output gap positively.
1.4.5 Individual country shocks
This section studies how strong output gap shocks and inflation shocks in individual member
countries of the euro area are transmitted to the euro area. This analysis is restricted to the
three large EA member economies in this study, Germany, France and Italy, as these are likely
to exert some influence on the euro area aggregate due to their economic importance.
As can be seen in the country systems in figures 1.3 - 1.5, the output gap shocks have only
a minor and mostly insignificant impact on the euro area aggregate. This is probably either
due to their minor importance in the estimation sample period or due to a bad identification.
This type of shock will therefore not further be investigated.
The second type of shock, that probably affects the EA as a whole, originating from the
larger EA members economies is an inflation shock. This is more interesting as it probably is
more likely to occur since administered prices and price regulations are a source of individual
member countries’ inflation factors, as a lot of policy areas like fiscal policy are still determined
on a national level. Table 1.4.5 displays the maximal effects and their timing of country-specific
inflation shocks.
output gap inflation
low p.e. high quarter low p.e. high quarter
DE DE -3.77 -1.64 -1.52 14 0.28 0.26 0.49 0
EA -0.99 -0.51 -0.86 14 0.27 0.29 0.65 6
FR FR -1.51 -0.85 -0.8 12 0.18 0.18 0.28 0
EA -2.05 -1.17 -1.09 13 0.39 0.38 0.64 7
IT IT -2.06 -0.82 -0.33 13 0.18 0.17 0.32 0
EA -1.96 -0.89 -0.45 14 0.18 0.29 0.66 6
Notes:one s.d. shock to the inflation rate corresponds to an increase of the
inflation rate by 0.26 (DE), 0.23 (FR) and 0.17 (IT) percentage points;
p.e. = point estimate; high (low) indicates the upper(lower) bound of the
90 % bootstrapped Hall Confidence Interval; own estimation.
Table 1.5: Individual EA member inflation shocks
We can observe that individual inflation shocks also transmit to EA inflation of a similar
magnitude for France and Italy, German inflation shocks appear to cause a significantly lower
degree of inflation for the EA as a whole. The output effects of French and Italian inflation
shocks tend to be slightly stronger for the EA output gaps than for the French and Italian
output gaps, for Germany we observe the opposite.
Regarding the timing of inflation stemming from the individual inflationary shocks we can
observe that for all individual shocks the maximal inflation effects occur six quarters after the
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shock. The resulting negative pressure on the output gap is maximal 12 to 14 quarters after
the inflation shock occurs, pointing at a uniform response in terms of the timing.
1.4.6 Contributions of common shock to national output gaps and inflation
An important question is to what extent do inflation and the output gap in the euro area de-
termine output gap and inflation developments in its member states. Therefore we conducted
a forecast error variance decomposition of the structural VAR models and compare the results
for the individual member states in table 1.6.
For the output gap we obtain that most of the variance can be attributed to the past
variance of the series for all economies but Finland, where euro area output gap changes are
the most important sources of variation. For the large economies except France domestic
inflation and the euro area output gap explain a large part of the variance in output gaps,
but the major contributions stem from past variation in the domestic output gap. The euro
area interest rate shock contributes to German and Italian output gap variance mostly after
about 3 years. For all other economies its contribution is however small.
As we would expect, a larger part of the variance in inflation and the output gap is
explained by euro area developments for small economies as opposed to large economies, since
the first largely depend more heavily on euro area business cycle developments.
The major component of the variance in inflation in the member states can be attributed to
past domestic inflation changes. The second largest component come for the large economies
is the domestic output gap developments followed then by euro area developments, where
we again observe for France mainly euro area inflation and for Germany and Italy euro area
output gap changes as a major euro area component. For the small economies, apart from
past domestic inflation fluctuations, the major components of variation in domestic inflation
across time is due to euro area output gap and inflation fluctuations.
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∆y˜it ∆piit
quarter quarter
4 8 12 16 20 4 8 12 16 20
∆y˜it 0.89 0.72 0.58 0.61 0.63 0.02 0.29 0.26 0.3 0.39
∆piit 0.02 0.12 0.14 0.12 0.11 0.57 0.39 0.39 0.35 0.29
DE ∆y˜it (EA) 0.03 0.03 0.08 0.11 0.09 0.28 0.17 0.17 0.19 0.16
∆piit (EA) 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.04
it 0.05 0.11 0.15 0.12 0.13 0.09 0.1 0.12 0.11 0.12
∆y˜it 0.63 0.43 0.45 0.47 0.4 0.11 0.23 0.41 0.3 0.35
∆piit 0.08 0.18 0.17 0.17 0.22 0.58 0.38 0.26 0.31 0.28
FR ∆y˜it (EA) 0.1 0.08 0.09 0.1 0.08 0.09 0.15 0.12 0.08 0.07
∆piit (EA) 0.17 0.28 0.26 0.24 0.26 0.18 0.21 0.18 0.29 0.26
it 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.03
∆y˜it 0.74 0.7 0.55 0.57 0.71 0.15 0.26 0.41 0.44 0.38
∆piit 0.06 0.05 0.07 0.07 0.04 0.71 0.49 0.36 0.29 0.29
IT ∆y˜it (EA) 0.15 0.08 0.13 0.18 0.12 0.08 0.13 0.09 0.09 0.13
∆piit (EA) 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01
it 0.04 0.17 0.24 0.17 0.12 0.05 0.11 0.11 0.16 0.18
∆y˜it 0.47 0.42 0.32 0.25 0.21 0.13 0.13 0.1 0.08 0.05
∆piit 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.56 0.45 0.35 0.28 0.19
FI ∆y˜it (EA) 0.46 0.41 0.48 0.59 0.55 0.22 0.34 0.39 0.34 0.49
∆piit (EA) 0.02 0.11 0.14 0.12 0.19 0.02 0.02 0.1 0.22 0.2
it 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.06
∆y˜it 0.72 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.61 0.01 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.04
∆piit 0 0 0 0 0 0.34 0.23 0.18 0.13 0.11
IRE ∆y˜it (EA) 0.13 0.2 0.28 0.28 0.27 0.22 0.15 0.18 0.35 0.45
∆piit (EA) 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.08 0.2 0.28 0.23 0.21
it 0.13 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.35 0.37 0.31 0.24 0.2
∆y˜it 0.65 0.62 0.59 0.61 0.64 0.16 0.12 0.19 0.32 0.49
∆piit 0.01 0.01 0 0 0 0.39 0.08 0.07 0.03 0.02
NL ∆y˜it (EA) 0.11 0.2 0.3 0.33 0.31 0.09 0.64 0.61 0.53 0.39
∆piit (EA) 0.17 0.14 0.08 0.04 0.03 0.15 0.1 0.08 0.08 0.07
it 0.06 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.22 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.04
Source: own estimation.
Table 1.6: Variance of output gap and inflation explained by the variance of other variables
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1.5 Summary
We investigated the role of different shocks to the euro area and its members using SVAR
techniques for the period after the introduction of the euro. We considered four types of
shocks, common output and inflation shocks, monetary policy shocks, oil price and global
demand shocks and idiosyncratic inflation shocks to the three largest economies of the EA.
Common output gap shocks in euro area affect most members’ output gap and inflation
rates in a similar fashion, in terms of timing and maximal effects, with inflation feeding through
more slowly. EA-wide inflation shocks appear to be transmitted to small member states more
strongly even though the timing is quite different. For the three large economies we observe
a rather inhomogeneous picture, as we observe a negative impact on German inflation and no
impact on Italian inflation.
For most of the member states in our study we find a relatively homogeneous picture
for the output effects of monetary policy in terms of the maximal effects and the timing.
Germany appears to be more strongly affected than the euro area aggregate, even though
the timing is the same. For the impact of monetary policy on inflation we observe however
a rather inhomogeneous picture. For Germany, Ireland and Finland we obtained comparable
maximal effects, even though the timing of the maximal impact is quite different. For the
other three economies the effect of monetary policy results in an increase in inflation rather
than a decline. This is very surprising and counterintuitive.
For exogenous shocks to the euro area we find that the instantaneous impact of oil price
inflation that is almost the same for the euro area and its members. Furthermore we see that
global demand shocks (as proxied by an increase in the US output gap) appear to affect only
some countries’ output gaps and thus their inflation rates significantly, but the ECB reacts
instantaneously to reduce inflationary pressures.
Finally the impact of individual country inflation shocks appear to impact the euro area
strongly, but the timing of maximal effects is almost identical for the three large EA members
in our sample.
Overall we find that the output effects of monetary policy are relatively homogeneous in
the first decade of the euro, inflation effects appear to be different still in terms of timing
and maximal impacts. Furthermore there is evidence that inflationary policies in individual
member states might have non-negligible impacts on inflation in the euro area as whole and
might create problems for the ECB to stabilise inflation and output fluctuations.
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Appendix
Summary statistics
Source: ECB, own illustration.
Figure 1.1: ECB and money market key rates 1999:1 - 2010:1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
(1) deposit facility 1.00 1.00 0.98 0.97 0.97
(2) main refinancing rate 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.98 0.96
(3) marginal lending rate 0.98 0.99 1.00 0.97 0.95
(4) EONIA 0.97 0.98 0.97 1.00 0.97
(5) EURIBOR 3M 0.97 0.96 0.95 0.97 1.00
Source: own calculations.
Table 1.7: Correlation between key interest rates, euro area, 1999:1 - 2010:1
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SIC AIC HQ sample size
euro area 2 3 3 1999:1 - 2008:4
de 1 2 2 1999:1 - 2008:4
fr 1 4 2 1999:1 - 2008:4
it 1 4 2 1999:1 - 2008:4
fi 3 3 3 1999:1 - 2008:4
ire 1 4 4 1999:1 - 2008:4
nl 4 4 4 1999:1 - 2008:4
Source: own estimation.
Table 1.8: Lag selection criteria and sample size
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Country systems impulse response functions
Figures 1.2 - 1.8 display the impulse response functions of the EA system and those of the
individual countries. The variables of the EA system are ordered in the following way: yt =
(y˜ea,t, piea,t, it)′.
Notes: first column top-down: accumulated response of the EA output gap, inflation and the interest rate to
a one s.d. output gap shock; second column top-down: accumulated response of the EA output gap, inflation
and the interest rate to a one s.d. inflation shock; third column top-down: accumulated response of the EA
output gap, inflation and the interest rate to a one s.d. interest rate shock. Dashed lines are upper and lower
bounds of the 95% bootstrapped confidence interval.
Source: own calculations.
Figure 1.2: Euro area System
The variables of the country models are ordered in the following way
yt = (y˜i,t, pii,t, y˜eat,t, piea,t, it)′.
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Notes: The first column top-down displays accumulated responses of the country’s output gap, the country’s
inflation rate, the EA output gap, EA inflation and the interest rate to a one s.d. country specific output gap
shock. The second column top-down displays accumulated responses of the country’s output gap, the
country’s inflation rate, the EA output gap, EA inflation and the interest rate to a one s.d. country specific
inflation shock. The third column top-down displays accumulated response of the the country’s output gap,
the country’s inflation rate, the EA output gap, EA inflation and the interest rate to a one s.d. EA output
gap shock; the fourth column top-down displays accumulated response of the the country’s output gap, the
country’s inflation rate, the EA output gap, EA inflation and the interest rate to a one s.d. EA inflation
shock; the fifth column top-down displays accumulated response of the the country’s output gap, the
country’s inflation rate, the EA output gap, EA inflation and the interest rate to a one s.d. interest rate
shock. Dashed lines are upper and lower bounds of the 95% bootstrapped confidence interval.
Source: own calculations.
Figure 1.3: German System
26
Notes: The first column top-down displays accumulated responses of the country’s output gap, the country’s
inflation rate, the EA output gap, EA inflation and the interest rate to a one s.d. country specific output gap
shock. The second column top-down displays accumulated responses of the country’s output gap, the
country’s inflation rate, the EA output gap, EA inflation and the interest rate to a one s.d. country specific
inflation shock. The third column top-down displays accumulated response of the the country’s output gap,
the country’s inflation rate, the EA output gap, EA inflation and the interest rate to a one s.d. EA output
gap shock; the fourth column top-down displays accumulated response of the the country’s output gap, the
country’s inflation rate, the EA output gap, EA inflation and the interest rate to a one s.d. EA inflation
shock; the fifth column top-down displays accumulated response of the the country’s output gap, the
country’s inflation rate, the EA output gap, EA inflation and the interest rate to a one s.d. interest rate
shock. Dashed lines are upper and lower bounds of the 95% bootstrapped confidence interval.
Source: own calculations.
Figure 1.4: French system
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Notes: The first column top-down displays accumulated responses of the country’s output gap, the country’s
inflation rate, the EA output gap, EA inflation and the interest rate to a one s.d. country specific output gap
shock. The second column top-down displays accumulated responses of the country’s output gap, the
country’s inflation rate, the EA output gap, EA inflation and the interest rate to a one s.d. country specific
inflation shock. The third column top-down displays accumulated response of the the country’s output gap,
the country’s inflation rate, the EA output gap, EA inflation and the interest rate to a one s.d. EA output
gap shock; the fourth column top-down displays accumulated response of the the country’s output gap, the
country’s inflation rate, the EA output gap, EA inflation and the interest rate to a one s.d. EA inflation
shock; the fifth column top-down displays accumulated response of the the country’s output gap, the
country’s inflation rate, the EA output gap, EA inflation and the interest rate to a one s.d. interest rate
shock. Dashed lines are upper and lower bounds of the 95% bootstrapped confidence interval.
Source: own calculations.
Figure 1.5: Italian system
28
Notes: The first column top-down displays accumulated responses of the country’s output gap, the country’s
inflation rate, the EA output gap, EA inflation and the interest rate to a one s.d. country specific output gap
shock. The second column top-down displays accumulated responses of the country’s output gap, the
country’s inflation rate, the EA output gap, EA inflation and the interest rate to a one s.d. country specific
inflation shock. The third column top-down displays accumulated response of the the country’s output gap,
the country’s inflation rate, the EA output gap, EA inflation and the interest rate to a one s.d. EA output
gap shock; the fourth column top-down displays accumulated response of the the country’s output gap, the
country’s inflation rate, the EA output gap, EA inflation and the interest rate to a one s.d. EA inflation
shock; the fifth column top-down displays accumulated response of the the country’s output gap, the
country’s inflation rate, the EA output gap, EA inflation and the interest rate to a one s.d. interest rate
shock. Dashed lines are upper and lower bounds of the 95% bootstrapped confidence interval.
Source: own calculations.
Figure 1.6: Finnish system
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Notes: The first column top-down displays accumulated responses of the country’s output gap, the country’s
inflation rate, the EA output gap, EA inflation and the interest rate to a one s.d. country specific output gap
shock. The second column top-down displays accumulated responses of the country’s output gap, the
country’s inflation rate, the EA output gap, EA inflation and the interest rate to a one s.d. country specific
inflation shock. The third column top-down displays accumulated response of the the country’s output gap,
the country’s inflation rate, the EA output gap, EA inflation and the interest rate to a one s.d. EA output
gap shock; the fourth column top-down displays accumulated response of the the country’s output gap, the
country’s inflation rate, the EA output gap, EA inflation and the interest rate to a one s.d. EA inflation
shock; the fifth column top-down displays accumulated response of the the country’s output gap, the
country’s inflation rate, the EA output gap, EA inflation and the interest rate to a one s.d. interest rate
shock. Dashed lines are upper and lower bounds of the 95% bootstrapped confidence interval.
Source: own calculations.
Figure 1.7: Irish system
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Notes: The first column top-down displays accumulated responses of the country’s output gap, the country’s
inflation rate, the EA output gap, EA inflation and the interest rate to a one s.d. country specific output gap
shock. The second column top-down displays accumulated responses of the country’s output gap, the
country’s inflation rate, the EA output gap, EA inflation and the interest rate to a one s.d. country specific
inflation shock. The third column top-down displays accumulated response of the the country’s output gap,
the country’s inflation rate, the EA output gap, EA inflation and the interest rate to a one s.d. EA output
gap shock; the fourth column top-down displays accumulated response of the the country’s output gap, the
country’s inflation rate, the EA output gap, EA inflation and the interest rate to a one s.d. EA inflation
shock; the fifth column top-down displays accumulated response of the the country’s output gap, the
country’s inflation rate, the EA output gap, EA inflation and the interest rate to a one s.d. interest rate
shock. Dashed lines are upper and lower bounds of the 95% bootstrapped confidence interval.
Source: own calculations.
Figure 1.8: Dutch system
Chapter 2
Financial Structure and its Impact
on the Monetary Transmission
Mechanism in Europe: A
time-varying interest pass through
model
2.1 Introduction
During the 1990s efforts to foster integration of the European market were intensified which
led to an increase in the degree of integration. The single most outstanding event in the
decade was the introduction of the common currency. This had - amongst other reforms - a
strong impact on financial markets. Out of financial markets the money markets experienced
the main push toward one single integrated market. Arbitrage opportunities were essentially
reduced by the introduction of one currency managed by a single monetary authority through
a single interest rate as well as a single euro area-wide payment system. Another indication
for the increased integration is the stark increase in intra-EMU cross-border interbank lending
over the 1990s till now. (Hartmann et al. 2003)
The integration of capital markets is not so pronounced, but there is evidence that capital
market movements have synchronised over the last decade. (see Fratzscher 2001) The lesser
degree of integration in capital markets points at factors which cannot simply be eliminated
by the removal of cross-border transaction risk, stemming from exchange rates and divergent
interest rates.
Therefore differences in financial structure were preserved in the course of European fi-
nancial integration. As a result, intermediaries, which are of considerable importance within
the financial structure of economies, play different roles, which is reinforced by the fact that
only few cross-country mergers were observed in the EMU area until 2002.(see Schmidt 2001)
The concentration on bank lending as well as the lack to draw resources from capital markets
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directly might also be rooted in the origin of the legal system in the country under considera-
tion, as was put forward by a number of authors such as La Porta, Lopez-de Silanes, Shleifer
& Vishny (1997), La Porta, Lopez-de Silanes, Shleifer & Vishny (1998) and Cechetti (1999).
Summing up, financial structure will have a considerable impact on the operation and effects
of the European central bank and is likely to lead to asymmetries in the European monetary
transmission. (Mojon 2000)
As Amable (2003) demonstrates, even though there was some considerable transformation
of financial structures within the last twenty years, most notably in France (compare also
Hackethal, Schmidt & Tyrell 2002) due to privatisation of the banking sector and capital
market reforms, through privatisation of parts of the economy other than banking and pension
reforms, financial structures are far from being uniform. This assigns different importance to
intermediaries such as banks throughout Europe. Banks will, depending on the environment
they operate in, reinforce or stand against actions of the central bank. In bank-based financial
systems, they will stand by their related customers and provide resources even in a time of
monetary tightness. Ehrmann et al. (2003) stress the importance of banking networks, such as
loan cooperatives and savings banks in some EMU economies like France, Germany, Austria
and Finland. The question that therefore arises is whether differences in financial structure
in Europe facilitate the operation of monetary policy of the European Central Bank or not
as financial structure seems to determine the nature of monetary transmission mechanism
through interest rate setting behaviour.
Cottarelli & Kourelis (1994) were the first to estimate the degree and speed of pass-through
of interest rates trying to link the effects of monetary policy in various countries on banks and
explaining it by financial structure variables. They show that there is significant influence
of financial structure on the monetary transmission mechanism which differs between various
countries. There are three other studies that seem to be of importance for the topic above.
Mojon (2000) estimates the interest pass-through by a vector error correction model (VECM)
for a rather large variety of different interest rates for some economies of the euro area for
various subsamples up until 1998. Therefore it is not possible to draw any conclusions about
the effects of the introduction of the common currency. De Bondt (2005) also estimates
interest pass-through VECMs for the euro area as a whole between 1996 and 2001. Again, as
for Mojon this specification does not allow to test for convergence issues as a VECM implies
that there is no adjustment to a new equilibrium but to the old. This is unlikely to occur
when a new policy regime like a common currency is introduced. With respect to convergence
Haan, Sturm & Toolsema (2001) provide interesting insights. In contrast to De Bondt (2005)
they estimate interest channels for a small set of individual member states of the European
union. They secondly let the pass-through parameters in contrast to VECMs vary over time
to tackle the question whether differences in interest pass-through across countries vanish over
time due to the introduction of the euro. They find however little evidence of convergence,
but this may be due to the relatively short span of the euro in operation. This paper tries
to redo on the one hand the analysis of Haan et al., as we have a longer period of the euro
in operation. On the other hand it goes beyond their analysis in terms of countries covered
and the convergence analysis undertaken combined with financial structure considerations.
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Thirdly it investigates the role of financial structure as an explanation for the differences in
the immediate interest pass-through in the European economies under consideration.
To test for the influence of the financial structure the following hypotheses will be evalu-
ated:
Hypothesis 1 There is convergence in the transmission mechanism within the EMU mem-
ber states.
Hypothesis 2 There is faster convergence between countries with similar financial struc-
tures than between economies with different financial structures.
Hypothesis 3 Due to the rigidity of financial structures there will not be any significant
speeding up of convergence in the European monetary transmission mechanism due to
the introduction of the euro.
These three hypotheses lie at the heart of this paper. The first tests whether there is
convergence at all. Given that there is convergence, hypothesis 2 states that one should see a
faster pace of convergence between countries with similar financial structures which was not
considered in Haan et al. (2001). The third hypothesis then aims to disentangle exchange rate
risk and the financial structure effect. So if all three hypotheses cannot be rejected we have
established that it is the financial structure that is important for the degree of asymmetry.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2.2 estimates and discusses
the main characteristics of the underlying econometric model. The second part 2.2.2 will
present the main results of the first step of the analysis. Section 2.3 presents the three
ways convergence and financial structure are linked in the paper, Sigma convergence, cluster
methods and panel regression analysis. Section 2.4 will conclude.
2.2 The Effects of Monetary Policy
2.2.1 The model
In this section we estimate the pass-through of monetary policy impulses through the banking
system of most old-EU economies. Even though this was done to some extent by Mojon
(2000), the specification differs in this study as we take into account the dynamics of monetary
integration. In contrast to Mojon (2000) the rolling regression technique is used to assess the
time variation in the estimators. Furthermore we do not estimate cointegrating relationships
between bank and policy interest rates as it is not clear whether there exists such a stable
relationship or whether it has changed due to the introduction of the euro. In this case we
would estimate something that does not exist, a stable long run relationship between bank
lending and money market rates. The data coverage is the third distinguishing feature of
this analysis. Last but not least, due to data availability, only a general bank lending rate
instead of more precise bank interest rates was used. As a baseline, the model used follows
the approach of Cottarelli & Kourelis (1994), which also forms the basis of Mojon’s (2000)
model.
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Cottarelli & Kourelis (1994) model assumes that financial intermediaries such as banks are
not neutral transmitters of monetary policy impulses. This is motivated by the observation
that bank rates are relatively inelastic with respect to shifts in the demand for loans as well
as deposits and that bank rates change less in magnitude than do money market rates.
As a first step, an equation that links bank lending rates to money market and discount
rates is considered1:
∆ij,t = αj,1 + αj,2∆ij,t−1 + βj,0∆dj,t + . . .+ βj,k∆dj,t−k +
γj,0∆mj,t + . . .+ γj,n∆mj,t−n + uj,t, (2.1)
where ∆ij,t, ∆mj,t and ∆dj,t represent changes of the lending rate, money market rate and
the discount rate at t for country j, where j = 1, . . . J . The values of β and γ will vary
over the countries in the sample, therefore there will be a different degree of stickiness in the
interest rates in every country. Using the β and/or γ vectors, various sets of multipliers are
derived, which will be in general nonlinear functions of the two parameter sets, and are given
by
hm,0 = γj,0, (2.2a)
hd,0 = βj,0. (2.2b)
hm,t+p = α
p
j,2γj,0 + . . .+ αj,2γj,p−1 + γj,p =
p∑
i=0
αp−ij,2 γj,i, (2.3a)
hd,t+p = α
p
j,2βj, 0 + . . .+ αj,2βj,p−1 + βj,p =
p∑
i=0
αp−ij,2 βj,i. (2.3b)
In the discussion we shall however mainly focus on the money market multiplier, taking
into account the direct effect of monetary policy in some countries.
2.2.2 Results
Before showing the multipliers implied by the estimated country models, a few words about
the model selection methodology. The country models are based on Cottarelli and Kourelis,
and the optimal lag length was chosen by minimising the AIC criterion. As during the 1980s
monetary policy did not solely rely on discount rate manipulation but also on other means
such as credit control, the model selection was also undertaken to chose between estimating
a pure bank lending lending rate and money market rate model as well as a model that
additionally included the discount rate of the central bank in the respective country. There is
1This equation corresponds to Cottarelli & Kourelis’s (1994) model 2. Model 1 is in levels for the lending
rates and money market rates, whereas the discount rate is in differences. The reason for that is that they
want to control for policy changes which are signals to the market. Model 2 was chosen because nearly all
interest rates of the countries investigated here are not stationary in levels, so that a model in first differences
is more appropriate.
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evidence in nearly every country, as figure 2.5 shows, that excluding the discount rate for the
whole sample leads to a misspecification of the interest rate pass-through models, as there is
additional information in the discount rate, that is not captured by variation in the money
market rates alone.
For the assessment of the impact of European monetary policy discount rates of central
banks exert a statistically positive influence on bank lending behavior. Not taking this into
account leads to misspecified models for these countries.
Figure 2.5 in the appendix plots the difference of absolute values between the absolute
value of the AIC of the money market rate only model and the absolute value of the AIC of
the model that also includes the discount rates over time. If the difference is positive, then we
would select the money market rate only model, if negative we would do the opposite. In the
cases of Belgium, Ireland, Italy and the Netherlands it can be seen that the inclusion of the
discount rate makes the mixed specification better over time, whereas in France and Finland
the difference is stable at slightly below zero. For the case of Austria and the UK the money
market rate only specification is preferable2. Nevertheless in order to ensure comparability
with the other models the discount rate was included. For Finland the money market only
model was chosen, as there is not such a big difference between both specifications on the one
hand and because the discount rate series for Finland only begins in 1987, which considerably
restricts the number of estimation subperiods. The exact specifications which were chosen are
shown in the appendix.
The money market multipliers
Figure 2.1 shows some important results. Only the impact multipliers are shown , but figures
2.6 and 2.7 in the appendix will show some of the patterns at the beginning and at the end of
the sample period. As these figures show, the model mainly characterises the first four periods
following a money market rate shock. For the fifth and sixth we find hardly any significant
movement. This is in line with the analysis of Cottarelli & Kourelis, as they have firstly set up
a model analysing the short run effects only, which secondly produces significant multipliers
up to the third lead. This can be justified on the basis of economic theory as in the long(er)
run other factors such as the demand for loans are important determinants for bank lending
rates.
The impact multipliers for market oriented economies like the Netherlands or the UK are
stronger than for typical bank-based economies such as Germany. Also, as Hackethal et al.
(2002) and Amable (2003) explain, France was moving toward the group of market-oriented
economies due to structural reforms in the mid-1980s. This development becomes dominant
at the end of the time span. Thus, the French banks’ response to money market movements
2This is interesting, as we would expect that in the case of the UK as a market-based financial system money
market rates convey the important information about monetary policy due to deep interbank markets already
in the 1980s, whereas in Austria we would assume that as banks dominate financial markets the opposite would
occur: this means for Austria that the money market interest rate should not be very informative. It could
probably be that in case of Austria, the money market rate is the only interest rate that conveys information
about monetary policy, as Austria did not undertake a monetary policy independently of that of the German
Bundesbank since the late 1970s. Thus, the Austrian discount rate is not informative at all.
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Source: own calculations.
Figure 2.1: Impact Multipliers
is stronger in latter regressions than in previous.
Belgium and Austria deserve special attention. According to Amable (2003) Belgium
displays the second lowest intermediation ratio of all EMU countries with a declining tendency.
As a consequence it is not surprising that money market impulses are transmitted quite
strongly. On the other hand Austria remains puzzling. As Amable shows Austria has by far
the persistently highest degree of intermediation, which could explain the outstandingly high
transmission after three months. But what remains puzzling is the high degree of transmission
at impact.
2.3 Impact of Financial Structure
To link the multipliers to financial structure variables, Cottarelli & Kourelis (1994) suggest
that they depend on the structural features of the financial structure of the economy:
hj,l = Zjηl + υj,l , (2.4)
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where Zj is a n-element vector describing the financial structure of the economy j and υj,l
are errors that are not correlated between the countries. Taking together all countries the
multiplier system can be re-written in the following matrix form:
h0 = Zη0 + υ0 , (2.5)
where Z is a J ×K matrix and l = 0, so that h0 is the impact multiplier. In a similar manner
medium and long term multipliers can be formulated,
hl = Zηl + υl. (2.6)
These equations enable us to study the effects of financial structure on the effects of
monetary policy in the various countries. While subsection 2.3.1 will deal with the multipliers
and look at the development of these over time, subsection 2.3.3 will discuss the direct effect
of financial structure on the transmission of monetary impulses.
The empirical model combined with the rolling regression technique allows to track changes
in the relationships we are interested in. There are various ways to characterise financial
structures of economies: We consider two concepts, the first being the legal family concept
due to La Porta et al. (1997) and for the second we follow a clustering suggested by Amable
(2003).
The idea behind the concept first introduced by La Porta et al. (1997) is that the legal
origin of the countries’ law code matters for the role capital markets play within the economy,
as they differ with respect to shareholder and investor protection. They globally find four
main families:
1. common law (English legal family)
2. civil law
(a) French legal family
(b) Scandinavian legal family
(c) German legal family
Civil law countries do give fewer rights to parties in capital markets, but the rights are
strongest enforced in German and Scandinavian countries.
By principal component and cluster analysis Amable (2003) pins down four groups which
are similar to the legal family grouping, but not entirely the same. He finds a factor that
explains 45 percent of the total variation, and which is defined by negative and positive
components:
1. negative: stock market cap. to GDP, ownership of large listed companies, percentage
of share held by institutional investors, M&A activity, accounting standards, importance
of venture capital
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2. positive: ownership concentration, scope of public ownership, share of the the pub-
lic sector, control of large firms by families, share of bonds in institutional investors’
portfolios
From this first step he performs a cluster analysis and finds four groups,
1. high level of protection, high importance of stock markets and institutional investors,
low public ownership:
USA, Canada, UK, Switzerland, Australia and Japan
2. larger than average control of firms by financial institutions:
France, Norway and Sweden
3. low importance of family control:
Ireland, Denmark, Finland and Austria
4. ownership concentration, lack of coherence to international accounting standards, low
M&A activity, low development of capital markets:
Germany, Spain, Italy Portugal and Greece
These two groupings will be taken as suggestions by theory in the first two parts of this
section. To gain more robust evidence the following three ways are undertaken to assess
potential changes, Sigma convergence, cluster analysis and panel regression analysis.
2.3.1 Sigma-Convergence
Concept
The concept of sigma-convergence originally stems from the growth literature. It states that
there is convergence (in growth) between a group of economies if the variation (in growth
rates) within the group declines over time. This is of course a more general idea that is also
applicable to other notions of convergence as well.
More explicitly, we are interested in the development of some kind of dispersion measure
such as the standard deviation,
σK =
√√√√ K∑
j=1
(mj −mK)2 , (2.7a)
where K is a group of k countries and m is the respective multiplier.
As different different groups may have different means this might bias the results and thus
lead to the wrong conclusions. Taking the different means into account we will alternatively
consider the coefficient of variation, which is defined as
cvK =
√∑K
j=1(mj −mK)2
mK
. (2.7b)
For this purpose the appropriate groups have to be defined. These groups should be found
by using an appropriate measure for the financial structure.
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Results
Figures 2.2, 2.3 and 2.4 not only give the grouping effect according to financial structure,
but let us also assess possible convergence patterns across countries, over time and over the
periods following a shock in the money market as well as discount rates.
Overall effects
Figure 2.2 displays convergence patterns distinguishing between money and discount rates.
We find that there is a clear trend towards a more uniform reaction of banks after one to
three months (compare the second to fourth graphs in the left hand side panel of figure 2.2).
This pattern clearly emerges in the late 1980s/ early 1990s, as the mass of observations are
in the subsamples at the beginning. However for the discount rate multipliers there is a
clear trend toward diversity over the 1990s and the beginning of the new century. From the
discussion about measuring monetary policy and the relative importance of money market
and discount rates we have to give more weight to the money market rate, especially as the
discount rate multiplier is not included in a third of the economies involved. Summing up we
cannot reject hypothesis one, even though there seems to be a contrary development for the
impact multiplier and the reaction four to six months after the interest rate movement.
It should be noted at this stage that the convergence measures for figures 2.2, 2.3 and 2.4
differ in the sense that figure 2.2 uses the ordinary standard deviation measure, whereas in
the latter two figures coefficients of variation are displayed.
40
Source: own calculations.
Figure 2.2: Variance of Multipliers
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Legal Family
Looking at the money market rate first, grouping according relative to legal families does
have an important influence on the variation of bank behavior in the first three and the fifth
months after the movement in the money market and only these are shown. The remaining
months are not shown for presentational clarity. For the impact multiplier no significant
impact can be found, as the response of the French legal as well as the German legal families
tend to diverge over time. In case of the French family this seems to have to do with the
money-market effect in Belgium, which is by far larger than in all the other economies within
this group. For the German legal family this divergence seems to be driven by the Austrian
development.
There is convergence in monetary transmission in Europe in the 1990s. This convergence
can be observed in the first three months following a money market rate shock.
Financial Structure
Looking at financial structure from a less historical perspective using the Amable-factors a
problematic feature is that we have to drop the Netherlands and can only look at group 3 and
4 because we only have the UK of group 1 and from group 2 we only have France. Therefore
it does not make sense to look at deviation measures for the first two groups.
For the money market (figure 2.4) grouping makes sense for five out of six cases (5th
month after the change in the money market rate). Similar to the legal family distinction a
significant grouping effect for the impact and the first three months after the change in the
money market rate is obtained. This seems to be robust across the two grouping procedures.
Given the convergence in Europe following a money market shock in the first three months,
the dispersion between countries with similar financial structure is further reduced. There
is a significant impact of financial structure on the convergence of the European monetary
transmission.
The conclusion is that there is a clear pattern of convergence in the money market in the
first three months following an interest rate movement. This is is even reinforced when we
look at the grouping motivated by financial structure considerations. Not only do we find
convergence in these months, but the variation in countries with similar financial structure
is also lower in these economies. This might be interpreted as an indication that financial
structure influences the convergence of the monetary transmission mechanism.
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Source: own calculations.
Figure 2.3: Variation due to legal family
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Source: own calculations.
Figure 2.4: Variation due to financial structure
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2.3.2 Cluster Analysis
Concept
The cluster approach3 turns the problem of σ-convergence upside down, as from only observing
the estimated multipliers groups will be formed. It is interesting whether the groups that are
formed on the basis of some measure that will later correspond to the groups that financial
structure would predict.
For our purposes we define for each sample period n = 1, . . . , N and country j = 1, . . . , J
a point
sn,j = (hj,m,0, hj,d,0, . . . , hj,m,p, hj,d,p) , (2.8)
where p are again periods ahead, h are the multipliers and m and d refer to the money market
and discount rates respectively.
Starting with sn,j groups on the basis of minimizing the distance between the country
points, groups with similar characteristics will be formed. The classical concept of distance
between points is Euclidean distance, which is defined as follows. Take any two points si =
(x1, x2, . . . , xp) and sj = (y1, y2, . . . , yp), the Euclidean distance is defined by
di,j = [(x1 − y1)2 + . . .+ (xp − yp)2]1/2.
In general there are two ways to do cluster analysis, hierarchical and non - hierarchical
clustering. The first class can be divided into agglomerative and divisive methods. In case
of the agglomerative method J clusters are the staring points, such that each country forms
a cluster. The two closest clusters are successively combined until only one cluster, which
consists of the whole group, remains. Divisive methods start from the biggest available group
and step down until there are exactly J groups. A popular way to find the closest cluster to
a given cluster is the centroid technique. For the agglomerative cluster method each cluster
consists of only one point. The centroid is the point the coordinates of which are just the
mean of all coordinates of the points in the respective cluster. So at the start each point
is the centroid of its own cluster. Then the two points the centroids of which are closest
are grouped into one cluster. Afterwards the minimal distance between the centroids of all
clusters is searched and the two clusters with the minimal distance form another cluster and
so on until one single cluster is left.
A popular non-hierarchical clustering technique is k-means clustering. For this method
the points are grouped into K clusters by some method. The centroids of these clusters are
calculated. Then the distance between every point in the set and the centroid of each cluster
is calculated. If it is closest to its own centroid the point is kept within the group. If not it
is assigned to the group the centroid of which it is closest. This is repeated until no point is
re-assigned.
3The discussion of cluster analysis follows closely Afifi, Clark & May (2004), chapter 16.
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Results
In the following subsection another way of detecting convergence is presented. Given the
sets of multipliers for the economies, can groups be identified and if yes, do these correspond
closely to the ones, the grouping of which is motivated by legal family or financial structure
groups?
For this purpose we first consider partitional clustering and look at the four group stage
given in tables 2.1 and 2.2.
group
1 2 3 4
1994 ie at de,e,f,fi,it,nl uk, be
1995 ie at, f, fi, nl de,e,it uk,be
1996 ie at, be de,e,f,fi,it,nl uk
1997 ie at, be, f, fi, nl de,e,it uk
1998 ie at, be de,e,it,uk nl,f,fi
1999 ie, e, uk at, be de,f,fi,it,nl it
2000 be at de,e,f,fi,ie,nl,uk it
2001 ie at, be de,e,f,fi,nl,uk it
2002 ie at, be de,f,fi e,it,nl,uk
2003 ie at de,e,f,fi,it,nl,uk be
2004 ie at, be, f, fi de,nl,uk e,it
grouping ie at, be de,e,f,fi,nl,it uk
Source: own calculations.
Table 2.1: Partitional Cluster Analysis: both multipliers
Looking at the overall effect a clear separation of the Common Law system from the
Civil Law system can be observed, as both, Ireland and the UK are clearly separated over the
individual years as well as on average. The difference between German and French law system
seems to be less pronounced in comparison, as France and Germany (as well as Belgium and
Austria) are often grouped into the same category. It is interesting that in every year, France
and Finland seem to be closest, as they are always in the same group.
Taking the other proposed proxy for financial structure proposed by Amable, there seems
to be a clear contradiction to Amable’s (2003) results, as France (an Amable group 2 country)
an Germany (an Amable group 4 country) are grouped almost always in the same group in
this analysis. What is in accordance with Amable (2003) is the grouping of Italy, Germany
and Spain in the overall consideration.
Additional to that a hierarchical cluster method was undertaken, which is summarised in
table 2.3. Dissimilarity between the economies increased in the late 1990s, but decreased after
2000, which is compatible with the results obtained from the section on sigma convergence.
Another similarity can be seen in table 2.1 that Ireland and the UK occupy a special position,
and most European economies are grouped into one group, which appears to be growing over
time.
Observing the pattern of monetary transmission mechanism we cannot identify groups
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Table 2.2: Partitional Cluster Analysis: money market multipliers
group
1 2 3 4
1994 at de,e,ie,it f,fi,nl be,uk
1995 at de,f,fi,ie,it,nl e be,uk
1996 at de,f,fi e,ie,it,nl be,uk
1997 at,be de,f,fi,ie,it,nl e uk
1998 at,be de,f,fi,ie,it,nl e uk
1999 at de,f,fi,ie,it,nl,uk e be
2000 at,be de,f,fi,ie,it,nl e uk
2001 at,be,uk de,f,ie,it,nl e fi
2002 at de,e,ie,it,nl be uk,f,fi
2003 at de,f,fi,ie,it,nl e uk,be
2004 at,be de,ie,it,nl f,fi uk
grouping at de,f,fi,ie,it,nl e uk
Source: own calculations.
minimal distance* group
for 4 clusters 1 2 3 4
1995 0.92 at, f, fi, nl de, e, it ie be, uk
1997 1.02 at, be de, e, f, fi, it, nl ie uk
2000 1.03 at, be de, f, fi, it, nl, uk e ie
2003 0.68 at, be de, f, fi, it, nl, uk e ie
*Euclidean distance metric; own calculations.
Table 2.3: Hierarchical Cluster Method
47
according to their financial structure. Considering the subset of money market multipliers the
UK still differs from the rest of Europe, but also Austria is separated. This latter observation
can potentially be attributed to the strong and dominant impact effect of the Austrian money
market on bank-credit interest rates. Another difference to table 2.1 is that Spain is nearly
always singled out. Again the difference between French and German legal families does
not seem to be too strong overall. As far as Amable (2003) is concerned the money market
multiplier that groups 3 and 4 (with the notable exceptions of Austria and Spain) seem to
have merged. So judging from cluster analysis we cannot fully identify groups due to financial
structure from only looking at the response of banks in the respective economies.
2.3.3 Panel Regression Analysis
Concept
Another way to assess the impact of financial structure on monetary transmission is to estimate
it directly by a panel regression. Within this framework proxies for the financial structure can
be directly tested for their influence on monetary transmission, in this case on the multipliers
of the money market as well as the discount rate multipliers. By a panel regression the (set
of) economy(ies) we are interested in can be accounted for more directly.
More formally we have the following system:
h0,(j,t) = Zjtη + uj,t , (2.9a)
uj,t = µj + νjt , (2.9b)
where j = 1, . . . , J , t = 1, . . . , T , Zjt is a vector of financial structure variables, µj measures
the individual effect in country j, and νjt ∼ N(0, 1) is a disturbance term.
The parameter vector η accounts for the influence of financial structure on the transmission
of monetary policy impulses. We first require all the parameters to differ significantly from
zero. As we also take into account time we will incorporate the euro effects and this will have
of course influence the estimation of the parameters.
If we were to account for changes over time, we could slightly change the specification of
equation (2.9b) to
uj,t = µj + λt + νjt , (2.9c)
where λt measures the time-specific effects. The model comprised of equations (2.9a) and
(2.9c) is typically referred to as a two-way panel.
The following structural variables will be used:
1. Volatility of of the money market :
residuals from an ARMA(p,q) fitted to the money market rate
2. Capital market deepness:
ratio of domestic market capitalisation to GDP
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3. Degree of intermediation:
(a) bank deposits to GDP and
(b) bank credits to GDP (both overall and non-financial corporations)
To account for other influences also inflation is included in the panel regression estimates.
From the previous discussion the following expectations can be made about the influence of
financial structure variables.
In an economy where financial structure matters all variables have a significant influence
on the multipliers. In countries with a higher degree of intermediation volatility and capital
market deepness exerts a lesser whereas the degree of financial intermediation exerts a higher
influence on the multipliers. In bank (or relationship) based economies the latter effect is
expected to dominate the other two and thus a negative individual effect (µj), which is
reversed for the market based (or arm’s length) economies.
Results
Of the countries investigated previously we unfortunately had to drop UK and Ireland as for
the UK there are not bank deposit series in the IFS database and for Ireland the market
capitalisation is only published from 1994 onwards. Whether to include Ireland or not is
debatable, even if the data were observable, as it is expected that the inclusion of this economy
would have distorting effects on the results due its fast growth during the 1990s. As table
2.9 in the appendix shows there is no significant difference between the one- and the two way
models, whereas the poolability tests indicate that estimating a pooled regression is worse than
estimating a panel regression model. In order to achieve parsimony, the one-way fixed effects
model was chosen. Given that there are only 8 countries in the sample a fixed effects model
is clearly the better choice over a random effects model. Five specifications were estimated.
In table 2.4 the variables market capitalisation(mc), bank deposits to GDP (bd) and the
yieldspread (ys) influence the impact money market multiplier significantly. Starting with the
maximum specification as discussed above we consecutively dropped all insignificant variables
until all variables were significant. This was done in a way to avoid a decrease in the adjusted
R-squared. If such a decrease occurred we would have left the otherwise insignificant variable
in the regression. The variable bd shows a positive influence on the multiplier as expected.
As the influence of banks channeling funds from households to firms increases so does the
rigidity of banks with respect to money market movements. The negative coefficient of mc is
not easily interpretable. It could probably be explained by the fact that if banks dominate the
stock market, the higher their influence in capital markets the lower the power of the market
to compete with the banks. This crucial implication depends on the assumption that banks
are dominant players in capital markets. The yield spread is the third source of influence,
and it has a positive effect. Considering a positive spread, when the margin between long and
short term interest rates widens, it becomes more attractive for banks to adjust their portfolio.
This is due to the fact that every adjustment is costly and therefore only adjustments are
undertaken if the gains from rebalancing the portfolio exceed the corresponding costs. This
occurs more often the bigger the spread in yields.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
market cap. .0005 -.0016 -.0018 -.0020 -.0019
(.0009) (.0005) (.0006) (.0006) (.0006)
bank dep./GDP -2.1510 2.7579 2.6056 2.5071 2.5713
(.5286) (.5588) (.5907) (.5828) (.5842)
yieldspread .0115 .0202 .0165 .0154 .0194
(.0181) (.0058) (.0074) (.0067) (.0076)
AT - .1980 .1896 .2004 .2333
(.054) (.0547) (.0533) (.0660)
BE* - .2735 .2981 .3112 .2959
(.0354) ( .0466) (.0442) (.0461)
DE* - -.5639 -.5429 -.5319 -.5455
(.039) (.0469) (.0449) (.0464)
E* - -.7372 -.7116 -.6972 -.7118
(.0443) (.0545) (.0524) (.0539)
F* - -.5711 -.5483 -.5322 -.5395
(.0561) (.0629) (.0622) (.0624)
FI* - -.5314 -.4924 -.4702 -.4921
(.0460) (.0666) (.0630) (.0658)
IT* - -1.0127 -.9708 -.9462 -.9685
(.1129) (.1243) (.1216) (.1229)
NL* - -.5653 -.5226 -.4972 -.5191
(.0430) (.0679) (.0645) (.0671)
t - - .0043 - -.0145
(.0053) (.0128)
t2 - - - .0006 .0017
(.0004) (.0011)
Obs. 80 80 80 80 80
Adj. R-squ. 0.1525 0.9498 0.9496 0.9505 0.9507
F-Stat. 5.74 150.55 136.25 138.99 128.06
Notes: Standard Errors in parentheses; * relative to Austria; own estimation.
Table 2.4: Panel Regression Results
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Financial structure significantly influences the extent of monetary transmission, because
financial structure factors exert a significant impact on the magnitude of transmission of
interest movements by European banks.
Furthermore all country dummies are significant. Belgium, which displays the lowest
intermediation ratio, has also a bigger multiplier than Austria. Netherlands and France
which usually display low degrees of intermediation have however a smaller intercept term
than Austria. This could be attributed to the fact that French and Dutch banks are more
international, which dampens the necessity for banks to react to domestic money market
developments.
We consecutively eliminated insignificant explanatory variables, still the signs were pre-
served and the variables mc, bd and ys stayed significant.
From specifications (3) - (5) there is no significant and common influence of the trend,
neither linear nor quadratic on the impact multiplier. Also the sign of the coefficients remain
unchanged. As however only 10 time points could be used this should be treated with caution.
After the inclusion of various forms of trends the influence of the proxies for financial structures
are reduced whereas the influence of country specifics are more pronounced, which could be
interpreted as an indication for a change. The adjusted R-squared indicates that model (5)
is preferred to model (3), indicating a negative non-linear trend for h0,m.
2.4 Conclusions
This paper has several objectives. First it tries to investigate how to best assess the impact
of monetary policy on bank behavior. The result is that within the structure of the chosen
model it is best for most European countries to include the discount rate together with the
money market rate, because the first exerts statistical influence on bank behavior in addition
to the information embodied in money market rate movements. Secondly we find that not
accounting for changes in European monetary transmission over the last two decades and
only estimating one single cointegration relationship ignores that the monetary transmission
mechanism might have become more similar in the EU. This study argues that bank reaction
to a money market rate shock has synchronised in the 1990s, not at impact but in the first
three months after a monetary policy shock. This is even more pronounced when countries
with similar financial structure are grouped accordingly. Starting with the nature of bank
response and trying to form groups accordingly does not allow to form groups of economies
with a similar financial structure. Last but not least we established that there is a significant
impact of financial structure on monetary transmission, because factors such as the ratio of
bank deposits to GDP or market capitalisation to GDP as well as the term structure have a
statistically significant impact on the degree of interest rate pass-through by banks. Summing
up we cannot reject any of the three hypotheses proposed in this paper.
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Appendix
Data Description
Type Label Source Range Category
Austria
Base Rate dAT OENB 1M1980:9M2004 key rate
3-month interbank rate mAT WIFO 1M1980:12M1998 market rate
new emissions rate lAT WIFO 1M1980:12M2004 lending rate
industrial production ipAT IFS 1M1980:12M2004 output
CPI cpiAT IFS 1M1980:12M2004 inflation
Belgium
discount rate dBE IFS 1M1980:12M1998 key rate
t-bill rate mBE IFS 1M1980:12M1998 market rate
lending rate (corporations) lBE IFS 4M1985:9M2004 lending rate
industrial production ipBE IFS 1M1980:12M2004 output
CPI cpiBE IFS 1M1980:12M2004 inflation
Germany
discount rate dDE BuBa 4M1980:12M1998 key rate
3-m money market rate mDE BuBa 1M1980:12M1998 market rate
lending rate (corporations) lDE IFS 1M1980:6M2003 lending rate
industrial production ipDE IFS 1M1980:08M2004 output
CPI cpiDE IFS 1M1980:09M2004 inflation
Finland
HELIBOR dFI BoFi 4M1980:12M1998 key rate
3-m money market rate mFI BoFi 12M1986:12M1998 market rate
lending rate (corporations) lFI IFS 1M1980:6M2003 lending rate
industrial production ipFI IFS 1M1980:08M2004 output
CPI cpiFI IFS 1M1980:09M2004 inflation
France
discount rate dFR BDF 4M1984:12M1998 key rate
3-month interbank rate mFR BDF 12M1986:12M1998 market rate
daily money market rate m1FR BDF 1M1980:12M1998 market rate
lending rate (corporations) lFR IFS 1M1980:9M2004 lending rate
industrial production ipFR IFS 1M1980:08M2004 output
to be continued ...
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Type Label Source Range Category
CPI cpiFR IFS 1M1980:09M2004 inflation
Ireland
short term credit facility dIE BoIre 1M1980:12M1998 key rate
3-m money market rate mIE BoIre 1M1980:12M1998 market rate
lending rate (corporations) lIE IFS 1M1980:9M2004 lending rate
industrial production ipIE IFS 1M1980:08M2004 output
CPI cpiIE IFS 1M1980:09M2004 inflation
Italy
discount rate dIT BI 1M1980:12M1998 key rate
3-m money market rate mIT BI 1M1980:12M1998 market rate
lending rate (corporations) lIT IFS 8M1983:2M2004 lending rate
industrial production ipIT IFS 1M1980:08M2004 output
CPI cpiIT IFS 1M1980:09M2004 inflation
Netherlands
Call money market rate dNL DNB 1M1980:12M1998 key rate
Aibor 3m mNL DNB 1M1980:12M1996 market rate
lending rate (corporations) lNL DNB 1M1980:10M2002 lending rate
industrial production ipNL IFS 1M1980:08M2004 output
CPI cpiNL IFS 1M1980:09M2004 inflation
Spain
refinancing marginal rate dE BEsp. 1M1980:9M2004 key rate
off. interbank reference rate diE BEsp. 1M1980:9M2004 key rate
3 month interbanking rate mE BEsp. 1M1980::9M2004 market rate
Lending rate (corporations) lE IFS 1M1980:9M2004 lending rate
UK
Monthly average of El. bills dUK BoE 1M1980:10M2004 key rate
discount rate, 3 month
t-bill rate mUK IFS 1M1980:9M2004 market rate
lending rate lUK 1M2004:8M2004 lending rate
industrial production ipUK IFS 1M1980:08M2004 output
CPI cpiUK IFS 1M1980:09M2004 inflation
EMU Data
main refinancing, fixed rate dEMU ECB 1M1999:6M2000 key rate
to be continued ...
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Type Label Source Range Category
main refinancing, min. rate dEMU ECB 6M2000:1M2005 key rate
EURIBOR, 3m mEMU BuBa 1M1999:1M2005 market rate
fixed conversion rates - ECB - -
Table 2.5: Data Description
Variable Range Frequency Source
market cap. to GDP 1988:2003 y World Dev. Indicators
bank deposits 1980:2003 y IFS database
bank credits 1980:2003 y IFS database
private sector bank credits 1980:2003 y IFS database
GDP 1980:2003 y IFS database
gvt. bond yield 1M1980:12M2003 m Datastream
Table 2.6: Panel Regression Data
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Regression Specifications
Austria
∆lat,t = α0 + α1∆lat,t−1 + β0∆dat,t + γ0∆mat,t + γ1∆dat,t−1 +
γ2∆mat,t−2 + γ3∆mat,t−3 + t (2.10)
Belgium
∆lbe,t = α0 + α1∆lbe,t−1 + γ0∆mbe,t + γ1∆dbe,t−1 + γ2∆mbe,t−2 +
γ5∆mbe,t−5 + γ7∆mbe,t−7 + γ8∆mbe,t−8 + t (2.11)
Germany
∆lde,t = α0 + β0∆dde,t + β2∆dde,t−2 + β3∆dde,t−3 + β4∆dde,t−4 +
β5∆dde,t−5 + γ0∆mde,t + t (2.12)
Spain
∆le,t = α0 + α1∆le,t−1 + β0∆de,t + β1∆de,t−1 + β3∆de,t−3 +
β4∆de,t−4 + β5∆de,t−5 + β7∆de,t−7 + γ0∆me,t + γ4∆me,t−4 + (2.13)
γ5∆me,t−5 + γ6∆me,t−6 + γ10∆me,t−10 + γ11∆me,t−11 + t
Finland
∆lfi,t = α0 + α1∆lfi,t−1 +
∑5
i=0 γi∆mfi,t−i + t (2.14)
France
∆lf,t = α0 + α1∆lf,t−1 +
∑14
i=0 γi∆mf,t−i + t (2.15)
Ireland
∆lie,t = α0 + α1∆lie,t−1 + β0∆die,t−0 + β1∆die,t−1 + β3∆die,t−3 +
β4∆die,t−4 + t (2.16)
Italy
∆lit,t = α0 + α1∆lit,t−1 +
∑2
i=0 βi∆dit,t−i + γ0∆mit,0t (2.17)
Netherlands
∆lnl,t = α0 + α1∆lnl,t−1 +
∑6
i=0 βi∆dnl,t−i + γ0∆mnl,0t (2.18)
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United Kingdom
∆luk,t = α0 + α1∆luk,t−1 + β1∆duk,t−1 + β2∆duk,t−2 + β6∆duk,t−6 +
β10∆duk,t−10 + +γ0∆muk,t + t (2.19)
Regression and Test Statistics
Multiplier Models - Regression Statistics
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Source: own calculations.
Figure 2.5: Model selection by AIC
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Source: own calculations.
Figure 2.6: Multipliers (money market rate)
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Source: own calculations.
Figure 2.7: Multipliers (discount rate)
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Residual Tests
As table 2.7 indicates we observe serial correlation in Germany, France, Finland and Italy
indicating changes in the nature of the estimated relationship and that, when estimating the
rolling regressions this autocorrelation disappears.
The regression residuals from France, Finland and Italy display heteroskedasticity. Thus,
the rolling regressions are estimated as before, but the standard errors are calculated correcting
for heteroskedasticity, which is due to White (1980) and computes the variance - covariance
matrix the following way:
Σ̂ =
T
T − k (X
′X)−1
(
T∑
t=1
u2txtx
′
t
)
(X ′X)−1
where ut are the OLS residuals, T is the sample size and X is a T × k matrix of regressors.
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Panel Regression Tests
Table 2.8: Variable description
Variable Description Calculation
MC market capitalisation as a share of GDP obt. from the DB (7 yr. ma*)
bd bank deposits to GDP obt. from the DB (7 yr. ma*)
bpuc public bank loans to GDP obt. from the DB (7 yr. ma*)
(total loans - private loans)
bpc bank credits to GDP obt. from the DB
(excl. public loans) (7 yr. ma*)
inf last year’s inflation (1994, . . . , 2003)
ys spread between government return (gvt. bonds) - mmrate
bonds and 3-month mmrates
vola volatility of the money market s.e. of fitted ARMA processes
from the mmr (2yr. ma*)
Notes: * ma = moving average
Table 2.9: Poolability Tests
pooled one-way two-way
rss 2.2054 0.29442 0.22998
df 7 64 55
Fstat. Fcrit dffcrit
ols vs 1w 59.3431735 2.15 (n-1,nt-n-k)
ols vs 2w 67.48916055 2.18 (n-1,nt-n-t-k+1)
1w vs 2w 0.240795395 1.54 (nt-n-k,nt-n-t-k+1)
Source: own estimation.
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Chapter 3
Aggregate Investment Behaviour,
Bank Behaviour and the monetary
transmission mechanism in small
EMU members
3.1 Introduction
In some member economies of the euro area (EA) we can observe a major break in the ratio
of credit to the private sector to GDP, normally used to assess the importance of banks in an
economy, between 1995 and 1998. Figure 3.1 plots the ratio for small EA members between
1970 and 2009. Until the mid-90s most later EMU members experienced a stable credit to
GDP ratio. Starting two years before the introduction of the common currency the Irish,
Portugese and Dutch credit to GDP ratio started to increase strongly and doubled until 2008.
The credit to GDP ratio in other small EA member economies (Austria, Belgium and Finland)
remained stable until 2009. Since all the small economies had the same currency, different
monetary policy objectives cannot serve as an explanation, a possible explanation is that the
common monetary policy had different impacts on credit in the EA member economies.
This different impact of monetary policy on credit markets in small EA members could
either arise from the supply side or different aggregate demand elasticities in these economies.
As credit is mainly transmitted through national banking systems, bank behaviour, most
importantly the different degree of pass-through of monetary policy impulses, might be one
source of variation across EA member states on the supply side. On the demand side, different
investment elasticities might cause the credit volume to react differently to common monetary
policy across economies in the EA. This article tries to disentangle demand and supply effects
in the transmission of monetary policy through credit markets of small EA members. Focusing
on small EMU members has the benefit that we do not have to account additionally for
structural changes in the EA monetary transmission mechanism, as every small EA member
will only have a negligible impact on the EA as a whole. Instead we can focus on deviations
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Notes: The shaded area represents the time before the introduction of the euro.
Source: Wold Bank Indicator Database.
Figure 3.1: Credit to the private sector in relation to GDP
from the EA as a whole.
Cyclical developments in small open economies will normally be driven by world develop-
ments and developments in its main trading partners. This especially applies to small open
economies in the European monetary union. Prior to the establishment of the currency union
macroeconomic policies in these economies depended on policies in larger EU economies, most
importantly Germany and France. This was primarily important for monetary policy, as most
later EMU members had to tie their currencies to the DM to ensure a credible commitment to
the European Monetary System (EMS). In contrast to small open economies, monetary policy
authorities in the four large economies in the EA of today were less restricted by a commit-
ment to the EMS. Ciccarelli & Rebucci (2006) show that monetary policy authorities in Spain
and Italy and, to a lesser extent, in France, were less committed to the goal of price stability
than the anchor central bank of the EMS, the German Bundesbank. For small open economies
in the EA we would expect that already prior to the introduction of the common currency
common cyclical movements will have played a major role for the components of GDP that
either depend directly on foreign demand such as exports or indirectly such as investment,
depending on interest rates movements determined outside the small open economies.
The introduction of a common currency nevertheless represents a major step to further
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synchronisation of cycles as transaction costs of export decrease due to elimination of exchange
rate risks. Furthermore the synchronisation of national commercial law codes preceding the
introduction of the common currency is likely to have changed national banking markets
leading to an increase in contestability and competition and therefore change bank behaviour,
which might trigger considerable structural changes in favour of synchronisation. Mojon
(2000) for instance provided evidence that competition among banks can lead to a more
synchronous interest pass-through. Bank reaction to monetary policy in Europe has recently
been studied in a number of papers. (compare Mojon 2000, De Bondt 2005, De Bondt,
Mojon & Valla 2005) Overall there is evidence that the response of retail bank interest rates
to monetary policy interest rates is rather sluggish and only complete after some time in
countries of the EA. In theory there are reasons to doubt whether banks will in general
immediately pass on interest rate increases by the central bank to firms completely. Stiglitz
(1999) presents a model of imperfect information studying bank behaviour in the transmission
of monetary policy. He demonstrates that banks can be reluctant to react to monetary policy
impulses due to their risk perception and net worth. This is because banks incorporate the
endogenous risk of default of their creditors in reacting to monetary policy.
Studies looking at business cycle synchronisation yield ambiguous results. Eickmeier &
Breitung (2006) observe a lower business cycle correlation for output and inflation for some
peripheral EA member states (Greece and Portugal) with the EA core than between the EA
core and new EU member states which are not EA members . Their analysis further suggests
that output and inflation linkages have not changed in the initial five years after the adoption
of the euro between member states. EA wide movements seem to explain movements in
inflation and output in the individual member states only to varying degrees. One problem
associated with this strand of the literature is that these articles look at total output and
not at its components that are more directly and thus more quickly influenced by structural
change and therefore more likely to be synchronised earlier after the introduction such as
bank behaviour and investment. This paper aims at filling this apparent gap. It focuses on
disentangling the effects of monetary policy on real investment in two distinct parts, bank
behaviour and investment behaviour.
Investment behaviour will primarily depend on the user cost of capital. The user cost of
capital is determined by the real interest rate in the economy. The real interest rate faced by
a company considering to undertake investment will depend on nominal interest rates set by
the central bank, inflationary expectations of all agents in the economy and commercial bank
behaviour. In the course of introducing the common currency the first two determinants of
real interest rates are likely to synchronise as in the beginning of the euro 11 central banks were
replaced by one central bank committed to price stability. Apart from that the user cost of
capital will also depend on legal constraints governing the tax treatment of the different forms
of investment financing. In the light of the synchronisation of tax codes prior to and after the
introduction of the common currency this source of variation is likely to vanish even though
the structures of the tax system within the EU area still exhibit considerable differences.
Investment demand in small open economies will further depend on external developments,
as these govern export demand which will influence investment demand. Furthermore to the
66
extent that the domestic business cycle of the small open economy is not entirely synchronised
with the business cycle of the larger currency union, developments in the domestic economy
will to some extent influence investment demand, as will be explained in the following section
in more detail. Summarising, it is not entirely clear which of the factors briefly sketched above
mainly drive aggregate investment in small open economies of the currency area.
This paper is related to the literature on credit effects in the monetary transmission
mechanism in a macroeconomic setting including theoretical as well as empirical contributions
on the credit and bank lending channels in the monetary policy transmission. The seminal
paper on the balance sheet channel of monetary policy was by Bernanke & Gertler (1989),
Bernanke & Blinder (1988) provide the seminal theoretical treatment of the bank lending
channel. How monetary policy affects credit conditions by banks was studies in an US context
by Lown & Morgan (2002). Kaufmann & Valderrama (2008) and Eickmeier, Hofmann &
Worms (2009) investigate the effects of macroeconomic fluctuations for the UK and Germany
and Germany and the EA respectively.
In addition this paper also draws on insights of the literature on the interest rate pass-
through of monetary impulses indicating that changes in the monetary policy rate have not
been instantaneously and sometimes not completely transmitted to retail banking interest
rates, even though there is evidence that the instantaneous transmission has accelerated after
the introduction of the euro. This was found for the EA as a whole in the article by De Bondt
(2005). Mojon (2000) finds that in the pre-euro era interest rate pass-through of monetary
policy rate changes was different across member countries in the EA. Further, De Bondt et al.
(2005) confirm the results on the sluggish adjustment to monetary policy rates for all EA
member economies and find that, even though the pass-through has accelerated after the
introduction of the euro, significant differences remain across countries.
This paper contributes to the literature in two ways. First it extends the standard SVAR
models to study the transmission of monetary policy to the real economy(e.g. Peersman &
Smets 2001, Mojon & Peersman 2001, Ehrmann 1998)1 incorporating bank behaviour and
stock market developments. Secondly it provides a framework to disentangle the transmission
of monetary policy effects on real investment in members of the EA in bank behaviour and
investment behaviour using the post 1999 sample only. Updating the results of the monetary
transmission framework at the ECB (e.g. Peersman & Smets 2001, Mojon & Peersman 2001)
was also recently suggested by the OECD (2009) in the report on the EA.
This paper is organised as follows. Section 3.2 discusses the channels through which
monetary policy affects investment behaviour. Section 3.3 follows with a discussion of interest
rate pass-through in the banking sector and discusses possible implications of the introduction
of the euro on the bank pass-through. Section 3.4 presents the empirical framework to analyse
the effects of monetary policy on investment and GDP in small EMU members and provides
a test framework for differences in bank behaviour and investment sensitivity across EMU
members. Section 3.5 presents the results, section 3.6 concludes.
1see also BIS (1994), Locarno et al. (2001),Cechetti (1999),Ciccarelli & Rebucci (2002),Clausen & Hayo
(2002),Ehrmann et al. (2003)
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3.2 The effects of monetary policy on investment
Empirical studies on the monetary transmission mechanism often find relatively large and
long lasting effects of monetary policy on real economic activity. These characteristics can
however not be entirely explained by a change in the cost of capital, which is likely to occur
immediately after the monetary policy intervention. This observation motivated the view that
credit markets will play an important role in the transmission process.
The so-called credit channel of monetary policy is due to the imperfect information between
lenders and borrowers, which leads to credit frictions. As a consequence there is a gap between
the opportunity cost of using internally generated funds and externally obtainable funds for
investment, the external finance premium. Proponents of the credit view argue that monetary
policy will influence the external finance premium in two ways, through the balance sheet of
firms and bank lending. (Bernanke & Gertler 1995)
The idea of the balance sheet channel is that a tightening of monetary policy will affect
the borrowers’ financial position or net worth, which is the sum of liquid assets and collateral.
(compare for instance Bernanke & Gertler 1989) The stronger a borrower’s financial position,
the smaller the potential conflicts of interest with the lender, the smaller the external finance
premium. Fluctuations in financial wealth will thus affect firms’ spending and investment
decisions. Monetary policy can affect the financial position in 3 ways. A direct effect will
be that due to the outstanding debt the borrower has, an increase in interest rates will raise
interest expenditure. Secondly, as rising interest rates are normally associated with declining
asset values, the borrowers’ balance sheets will be weakened. A more indirect effect is that
increases in interest rates will induce a borrowers’ customers to decrease their spending, which
will depress the borrowers’ revenues and thus over time will decrease borrowers’ net worth
and probably creditworthiness. (Bernanke & Gertler 1995)
The bank lending channel focuses on the role of banks in the transmission of monetary
policy. (e.g. Bernanke & Blinder 1988) This channel recognizes banks as the dominant source
of external finance. If the central bank increases its policy interest rate, increases in the costs
of funds for banks will lead to a decrease of the volume of credit supplied to the economy
and therefore raise interest rates at which firms can obtain credit. By how much the lending
rate increases will depend on several factors, namely competition in the banking system,
considerations of banks about how the risk of default of their customers is affected as well as
bank behaviour in general.
Monetary policy will further affect real investment spending by changing the real interest
rate (rr) and expectations about future economic activity. Due to wage and price stickiness a
change in the central bank’s key nominal interest will affect their nominal lending rates and
finally the real interest rate companies face, or,
recb ↑→ rl ↑→ rr ↑→ I ↓
Because of the balance sheet channel the net worth of borrowers will be altered by mone-
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tary policy decisions, as indicated above, or,
recb ↑→ passets ↓→ net worth ↓→ rl ↑→ I ↓
Apart from that, investment behaviour will depend on expectations about the future
economic development. In his famous article Tobin (1969) introduced a concept later named
after him, Tobin’s q. The underlying idea behind Tobin’s q is that a firm compares the total
expected revenue stream generated by the project with the cost of the investment. If the value
of future revenues is greater than the cost of investment the project is worth undertaking.
Assuming that stock market developments reflect all available information at a given point
in time, we can infer that the stock market value of firms is equal to the present value of
expected value of future of future profits. As in practice marginal q is hard to measure,
empirical studies used a related idea, average q. Average q can be approximated by the total
market value of the firm divided by the replacement cost of its capital. Therefore we would
expect a negative effect of interest rates on investment, as an increase in interest rates is
associated with a decrease in stock market returns. (compare Caballero 1999, Taylor 1999)
Furthermore if q is high, the market value of firms relative to the cost of capital is high and
thus new capital goods are cheap relative to the market value of the firm. (Mishkin 1995) To
summarise,
rl ↑→ q ↓→ I ↓
passets ↑→ q ↑→ I ↑
Another approximation to empirically include expectations inherently in the investment
decision process is to take into account capacity utilisation. To approximate this, the business
cycle measured in terms of past changes in real GDP (yt−p) will influence investment decisions,
or
yt−p ↑→ capacity utilization ↑→ I ↑
3.3 Monetary policy and bank behaviour
The credit view of monetary policy transmission sketched above emphasizes the special role
of banks. Bank behaviour was so far analysed in isolation, most papers concentrated on the
pass-through of monetary policy impulses. Empirical studies of the interest rate pass-through
have shown that interest rates are not instantaneously and completely transmitted. De Bondt
(2005) investigates the interest rate pass-through for the EA and finds that the initial pass-
through of interest rate prior to the introduction of the common currency is typically 50%
initially and it takes up to three years that money market interest rate increases are fully in-
corporated in bank lending interest rates. After the introduction of the common currency the
initial pass-through of interest rates appears to have increased, and also the speed at which
banks pass on their increased cost of capital to their customers increased. He explains this
change by an increase in competition in the European banking market after the introduction
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of the euro. Competition is hard to measure, there is however some indication that competi-
tion increased. Cross-border interbank lending activity has increased considerably since the
introduction of the common currency. Also cross-border retail lending activity has increased.
It is however still at a low level compared to interbank lending. (compare OECD 2009)
Competition is certainly a factor that might influence banks’ decision to pass on interest
rates to their borrowers to different degrees. Another explanation was provided by Stiglitz
(1999), showing that banks, because they incorporate their borrowers’ risk of default in a
situation where credit is tightened into their decisions, may be reluctant to pass on increases in
interest rates due to effects tighter monetary policy has on their borrowers’ financial position.
Thus Stiglitz’s argument would indicate that
recb ↑→ rl ↑→ GDP ↓→ risk of default ↑→ rl
Another reason why banks might not pass on monetary impulses completely in the be-
ginning is that money market volatility plays a role for the degree of interest pass-through.
Because of the increase in integration in European interbank markets (compare OECD 2009),
banks in small open economies are likely to benefit from the integration into a larger currency
area via the access to a deeper interbank market with a lower volatility.
Kaufmann & Valderrama (2008) and Eickmeier et al. (2009) investigate the effects of
macroeconomic fluctuations on bank behaviour in the UK and Germany and Germany and
the EA respectively. Whereas Eickmeier et al. (2009) find no indication of amplifying effects
of credit market frictions in the transmission of monetary policy, Kaufmann & Valderrama
(2008) find evidence for procyclical effects in lending. Furthermore they find cross country
differences in lending in response to real shocks to the economy. This suggests that bank
behaviour might have changed due to the introduction of the common currency, which might
lead to a higher integration of markets through increases in intra-EA trade (as suggested by
Rose 2000, Rose 2001). As a consequence we might observe a higher business cycle correlation
in the EA. Evidence from the first five years of the euro, however, seems to suggest that
correlations were not higher for all EMU members. Eickmeier & Breitung (2006) find that
Portugal and Greece displayed a lower degree of business cycle correlations with the EA core
than some eastern European EU members that are not members of the EA.
It is therefore not clear whether establishing a monetary union will lead to a more similar
bank behaviour in small members of the EA.
3.4 The empirical framework
To model the various determinants for investment and bank behaviour we consider the fol-
lowing structural VAR model:
yt = A(L)yt +Dxt +Bνt, (3.1)
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where yt is a vector of endogenous variables, A(L) is a lag matrix polynomial, D and B are
coefficient matrices, xt is a matrix of exogenous variables and νt is a vector of idiosyncratic
shocks. The structure of the coefficient matrices and variable vectors is given by
y =

∆yea,t
piea,t
recb,t
∆yi,t −∆yea,t
rl,t − recb,t
rsm,t
∆ii,t −∆yi,t

,B =

b11 0 0 0 0 0 0
b21 b22 0 0 0 0 0
b31 b32 b33 0 0 0 0
b41 0 0 b44 0 0 0
b51 0 b53 b54 b55 0 b57
b61 b62 b63 b64 b65 b66 b67
b71 0 0 b74 0 0 b77

, D =

d11 0 d13
0 d22 d23
0 d32 d33
d41 0 d43
d51 0 d53
0 d62 d63
d71 0 d73

xt = (∆yus,t, pioil,t, 1) , A(L) =
[
Aea(L) 0
A1(L) A2(L)
]
, A1(L) =

a41 0 0
a51 0 a53
a61 a62 a63
a71 0 0

The first three equations of every country-system describe a small-scale monetary model
of the EA, where the first equation explains the changes in EA real GDP as a function of
innovations to EA real GDP and past movements of EA real GDP, EA inflation, and a short
term money market rate.
The second equation can be interpreted as a Phillips-curve, which describes EA inflation
as a function of past movements of EA real GDP, EA inflation and a short term money market
rate as well as contemporaneous innovations to EA real GDP and to the inflation rate.
The third equation describes the short term EA interest rate as a function of current
innovations to EA real GDP, EA inflation, and the interest rate as well as of past movements
of EA real GDP, EA inflation and a short term money market rate. It can be considered a
monetary reaction function.
The last four equations focus on deviations from EA variables. The fourth equation
describes the deviations of country-level real GDP from EA real GDP as a function of current
and past real EA GDP, its own lags, past innovations to the spread between national lending
rates and the EA interbank rate, stock market returns, and deviations of real investment
growth from national GDP growth. Furthermore changes in real GDP area also depend on
current US real GDP growth as well as an idiosyncratic shock to the economy’s real GDP
growth deviating from EA GDP growth.
The fifth equation describes the economy’s lending rate spread to the EA interbank interest
rate as a function of past EA inflation in order to capture differences in area-wide inflationary
expectations by the economy’s banks. Current and past deviations of national GDP from EA
GDP growth, current and past national EA GDP shocks and current and past deviations of
national real investment growth from national GDP growth to proxy for credit demand at the
national and EA level. The bank lending rate spread is further a function of the EA short
term rate which is driven by monetary innovations of the ECB, as banks obtain funds on the
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European interbank market. As indicated above banks’ decision to alter lending rates will
also depend on stock market returns, which enter the bank lending rate equation in a lagged
way. This equation will be discussed in section 3.4.1 in further detail.
The economy’s stock market returns will react to all variables simultaneously as well as
to past innovations of all variables.
Deviations of real investment from real GDP growth will depend on current and past
innovations of EA real GDP and current US GDP as a proxy for international demand move-
ments. It furthermore depends on past national real GDP growth for reasons outlined above.
As expectations about future economic activity are especially important for investment deci-
sions we include past stock market index changes in this equation. Furthermore, because of
the credit channel, we also include current innovations to lending rate spreads as well as past
movements of lending rate spreads in the equation. For a further discussion see section 3.4.2.
The vector νt represents current innovations to the system in equation (3.1). The first
shock (ν1) is allowed to affect all variables of the system simultaneously and is interpreted as
an EA-wide aggregate demand shock. Shock ν2 only affects EA-wide inflation, the interbank
rate and the change in the national stock market index and is interpreted as an EA inflation
shock. The third shock affects the EA interbank rate, the spread between bank lending
and interbank interest rates as well as the change in the stock market index. This will be
interpreted as a monetary policy shock.
The second set of shocks (ν4 - ν7) are shocks that only affect national variables simultane-
ously. This is done to account for different degrees of business cycle correlations, different bank
behaviour as well as different degrees of stock market integration between members of the EA.
ν4 affects all national variables simultaneously and is therefore interpreted as a national AD
shock. ν5 affects the spread between bank lending rates and changes in stock market returns
and is interpreted as a shock to bank behaviour that is not related to the monetary policy
shock. ν6 is a shock to the economy’s stock market that is not related to any other shock
in the system. Finally ν7 is a shock to the economy’s investment that simultaneously affects
bank lending rate spreads as well as changes to national stock market indices.
3.4.1 Bank Behaviour
The interest rate pass-through is modeled by equation (5) of the system given in (3.1). More
explicitly this equation is given by
rl,t − recb,t =
p∑
j=1
α53,jrecb,t−j + b53ν3,t +
p∑
j=1
α55,j (rl,t−j − recb,t−j) + b55ν5,t + . . .
. . . +
p∑
j=1
α51,j∆yea,t−j + b51ν1,t +
p∑
j=1
α54,j (∆yi,t−j −∆yea,t−j) + b54ν4,t + . . .
. . . +
p∑
j=1
α57,j (∆ii,t−j −∆yi,t−j) + b57ν7,t +
p∑
j=1
α56,jrsm,t−j + b56ν6,t + . . .
. . . + d51∆yus,t + d53.
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The spread between bank lending rates and EA interbank rates (rl,t − recb,t) therefore
depends on shocks to the interbank interest rate as determined by the ECB, past changes
in interbank rates as well as shocks to the spread between interbank and bank lending rates
and the past evolution of this spread. This is a more general formulation of the interest
pass-through than in models by Cottarelli & Kourelis (1994), Mojon (2000), De Bondt (2005)
and De Bondt et al. (2005). These papers formulate interest pass-through models either as
VECM models using the interbank and bank retail rates or as simple single equation models
either that use cointegration techniques or estimating the models in differences. It is however
questionable whether cointegration techniques will yield important insights in a period of
structural change in the banking sector over the last 15 years. It furthermore ignores useful
information stemming from the transition of one monetary policy regime to another, i.e. the
transition from one steady state of a small open economy to another. Furthermore the order
of integration of interest rates is not clear from an economic point of view. Looking at the
spread between bank lending and interbank interest rates on the basis of a single equation
assumes that interbank rates will not change due to changing macroeconomic conditions,
hence it assumes that the interbank rate stays constant after the change. This is a special
case of equation (3.2), which is however not very likely to occur, therefore the actual interest
rate pass-through might be different to the results suggested by Mojon (2000), De Bondt
(2005) and De Bondt et al. (2005).
The formulation of the equation above is slightly more general for another reason than clas-
sical models of the interest rate pass-through, as the time-varying spread between interbank
and bank retail rates furthermore depends on EA AD shocks (ν1,t), on national AD shocks
(ν4,t), which are independent of EA AD shocks and idiosyncratic national AD shocks, as well
as past movements in EA GDP and deviations of national GDP from EA GDP movements.
The second line in equation (3.2) accounts for other national sources of innovation, current id-
iosyncratic investment shocks (ν7,t), past deviations of investment growth rates from national
GDP growth rates, as well as current stock market innovations (ν6,t) and past movements
in quarterly stock market returns. The last line in equation (3.2) accounts for exogenous
disturbances by including US output movements.
If banks pass on monetary policy rates completely and instantaneously, we would not
expect rl,t − recb,t to be significantly different from zero. The time length of the difference in
the spread from zero will therefore measure the time banks take to pass-through interest rate
impulses by the central bank.
3.4.2 Differences in monetary policy effects on aggregate investment and
GDP
If banks passed-through monetary policy impulses completely and symmetrically, asymmetries
in transmission of monetary policy monetary policy impulses might still arise from different
interest sensitivities of output and investment, i.e. from aggregate demand (either total or
investment demand). This cannot, however, fully be assessed in the current framework as the
interest pass-through is most likely not symmetric and complete. We can nevertheless obtain
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some insights from the effects of monetary policy on national investment and GDP. Equation
(4) in the equation system in (3.1) measures the effects of monetary policy on national output
in comparison to EA GDP,
∆yi,t −∆yea,t =
p∑
j=1
α41,j∆yea,t−j + b41ν1,t +
p∑
j=1
α44,j (∆yi,t−j −∆yea,t−j) + b44ν4,t + . . .
. . . +
p∑
j=1
α45,j (rl,t−j − recb,t−j) +
p∑
j=1
α46,jrsm,t−j + . . .
. . . +
p∑
j=1
α47,j (∆ii,t−j −∆yi,t−j) + d41∆yus,t + d43.
Deviations of national from EA growth rates are explained by an EA AD shock and an
idiosyncratic shock to the economy’s GDP growth differential as well as past movements in EA
GDP growth and the national-EA growth differential. Monetary policy affects the economy’s
GDP differential with respect to the EA through the above discussed spread between bank
lending rates and interbank rates. Furthermore lagged investment deviations and lagged
quarterly stock market returns affect the economy’s growth differential with respect to the
EA. If monetary policy does not affect national GDP differently than EA GDP, ∆yi,t−∆yea,t
will not be different from zero. Assuming for the moment that the interest rate pass-through
of monetary policy impulses is instantaneous, complete and symmetric the response of ∆yi,t−
∆yea,t to monetary policy shocks could then be interpreted as a difference in interest rate
sensitivities of national and EA outputs.
The last equation of system (3.1) models deviations of national real investment growth
from national output growth in a similar way,
∆ii,t −∆yi,t =
p∑
j=1
α71,j∆yea,t−j + b71ν1,t +
p∑
j=1
α74,j (∆yi,t−j −∆yea,t−j) + b74ν4,t + . . .
. . . +
p∑
j=1
α75,j (rl,t−j − recb,t−j) +
p∑
j=1
α76,jrsm,t−j + . . .
. . . +
p∑
j=1
α77,j (∆ii,t−j −∆yi,t−j) + b77ν7,t + d71∆yus,t + d73, (3.2)
except that the idiosyncratic investment shock (ν7,t) is included.
Assuming that the bank pass-through is complete, instantaneous and symmetric and that
the reaction of national GDP is the same as EA GDP, the reaction of investment to monetary
policy shocks measures differences in interest rate sensitivities of investment and GDP in the
respective economy. If ∆ii,t −∆yi,t is not significantly different from zero at all points of the
response function to the monetary policy impulse, then interest rate sensitivities of investment
and output are the same implying symmetric effects of the common monetary policy.
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3.5 Results
3.5.1 Data
The model described in the previous subsection was estimated for the period 1999:1 - 2009:4.
Data for real GDP, real investment and harmonised consumer price indices were obtained
from the OECD’s economic outlook database. The EURIBOR3M interest rate was used to
approximate the EA short term money market rate. Lending rates were obtained from the
IFS database. However most general lending rates were published only until the end of 2003.
From 2003 onwards we continued the series with the quarterly change in the average of all
published and more detailed lending rates. Details can be found in tables 3.2 and 3.3 in
appendix 3.6. Stock market indices were taken from the Thompson datastream database.
Details on the indices used can be found in the appendix. Interest rates enter in levels, all
other variables enter in quarter-on-quarter changes in logs.
All country models were estimated using a FGLS estimator, we tested the inclusion of
more than one lag by AIC (up to two lags2). Lag lengths3 are of the models are provided in
table 3.4 in the appendix.
3.5.2 Effects of monetary policy in the euro area
Figure 3.8 in the appendix displays the impulse response functions of the EA submodel defined
by the first three equations in (3.1).
The first column of graphs in the figure displays the reaction of EA inflation and the
European 3 months interbank rate to an unanticipated EA-wide AD shock. The increase in
aggregate demand exerts inflationary pressures that lead to an increase in inflation, which is
however not significant. This can be attributed to the increase in the monetary policy deter-
mined 3 month money market rate which slows down aggregate demand and thus inflationary
pressures decrease again.
The second column of graphs displays the effects of an unanticipated increase in inflation
which leads to an increase in the monetary policy determined interest rate that drives down
aggregate demand, leading to a decrease in inflation.
shock Magnitude GDP Inflation Interest rate
ν1 0.41 0.7* 3 0.19 3 0.42* 4
ν2 1.06 -0.2 8 1.06* 0 0.06 3
ν3 0.24 -0.5* 8 -0.12* 5 0.24* 0
Source: own estimation.
Table 3.1: EA: Maximal Effects of EA shocks
The third column shows the effects of an unanticipated monetary policy shock, which
2We restricted the maximal number of possible lags to two in each equation system, as in some equations
the number of parameters is large and given the chosen sample size (48 quarters) the degrees of freedom are
already low. A more detailed description of the choice of lags can be found in the appendix.
3For the Netherlands we initially used 2 lags for the country submodel as suggested by the AIC, which
however led to unstable results. We re-estimated the Dutch model with only one lag, which led to stable
impulse-response functions. All Dutch results shown below refer to the latter model.
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causes aggregate demand to decrease and therefore leads to a decrease in inflation. The
maximal effect can be observed eight quarters after the shock, as shown in table 3.1.
3.5.3 Determinants of bank and investment behaviour
Figures 3.2 and 3.3 display the implied forecast error variance decompositions of bank lending
spreads and deviations of national real investment growth from national real GDP growth.
Figure 3.2 displays the sources of variation in bank lending spreads implied by model 3.1.
A large part of the variation stems from monetary policy impulses as well as EA aggregate
demand developments. Whereas for Austria, Finland and the Netherlands the variance in
spreads can be primarily explained by the monetary policy shock, the EA aggregate demand
shock is the dominant source of variation in Belgium, Ireland and Portugal. Furthermore
national deviations of real GDP growth from EA real GDP growth appear to affect bank
behaviour more significantly in Austria and the Netherlands (and to some extent also in
Ireland) than in the remaining small EA members.
Source: own calculations.
Figure 3.2: Variance Decomposition: Bank lending rate - interbank interest rate spread
Figure 3.3 plots the sources of variation of the investment - GDP growth differential.
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In all economies lagged own variation is the dominant source of variation for the growth
differential. The second major source of variation stems from the EA aggregate demand
shock, which would be expected in a small open economy. For Ireland we observe that past
variation due to monetary policy shock explains up to 20 % of the variation in the deviation
of national real investment growth from nation real GDP growth. Interestingly deviations
of national real GDP growth from EA real GDP growth appears to impact the deviation of
national investment growth from national real GDP growth in Austria, the Netherlands and
Portugal, a similar feature that could be observed in figure 3.2.
Source: own calculations.
Figure 3.3: Variance Decomposition: Investment behaviour
77
3.5.4 Bank Behaviour
Figure 3.4 displays the reaction of the spread between the bank lending rate and the interbank
rate to a one s.d. increase in the monetary policy rate influenced by the ECB, implied by the
structure of equation (3.2) in system (3.1).
Notes: Response of rl,t − recb,t to a one s.d. deviation (30 Basis Points) increase in the Euroibor3M
rate. The dashed lines are upper and lower bounds of the 95% bootstrapped confidence interval.
Source: own calculations.
Figure 3.4: Deviation of bank lending rate from the Euribor3M
Similar to past studies of the interest rate pass-through we cannot observe an instantaneous
and complete pass-through of monetary policy impulses through banks. There is a significant
negative difference between the increase in the Euribor3M and the increase in bank lending
rates, implying a spread of about a third (10 basis points) of the monetary impulse in the
same quarter, the exception being Austria with a stronger increase in bank lending rates. For
almost all economies the spread between the interbank rate and bank lending rate is back to
normal levels after about 12 quarters, which is similar to results of De Bondt et al. (2005) for
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the EA as a whole. However the spread is not significantly different from zero after about 2-3
quarters for most economies, which might indicate that the monetary policy is transmitted
more quickly through the banking sector than suggested by the literature.
3.5.5 Differences in monetary policy effects on aggregate investment and
GDP
Figure 3.5 displays the deviation in the national growth rate from the EA GDP growth rate
following an interest rate shock of the ECB. This allows us to assess whether differences in
monetary transmission might be due to differences in interest rate elasticities of GDP across
countries. For Austria, Netherlands, Finland and Ireland we observe a slightly stronger impact
of monetary policy in the first year, which is only significantly different from zero for the latter
two economies. In case of Belgium and Portugal the impact of monetary policy on output
appears to be weaker than in the EA as a whole, even though the difference is not statistically
significant from zero.
Figure 3.6 displays the impact of a monetary policy shock to the difference in national
investment and GDP growth. This indicates that investment in most small economies reacts
more strongly than national GDP, however, with the exception of Ireland, the confidence
bands indicate that these stronger effects are not statistically different from zero.
Summarising, monetary impulses appear to be more strongly transmitted by Austrian
banks than in the other economies, on the other hand the impact on Austrian GDP and
investment appear to be stronger, though the response functions are not different from zero
in the latter cases. This indicates that investment and GDP appear to be less interest rate
sensitive than in the other small economies. Monetary policy impulses are more sluggishly
transmitted through the banking systems of all the other economies in the first eight quarters,
for Finland and Ireland however the effects on investment and GDP are stronger, implying a
higher interest rate sensitivities of these macroeconomic aggregates. For Belgium we observe
a lower degree of transmission to output and a higher degree of transmission to investment,
implying a higher interest rate sensitivity for Belgian investment and a lower interest rate
sensitivity for Belgian GDP in general, even though this is not significantly different from
zero. Portugal, following the same line of argument, displays a lower interest rate sensitivity
of output as well as investment. In case of the Netherlands the transmission of monetary
impulses through the banking system appears to be sluggish, the effects on Dutch real output
appear to be more pronounced in comparison to the reaction of EA output pointing at a higher
output sensitivity with respect to monetary policy shocks. On the other hand investment
reacts weaker than national output suggesting a lower interest rate sensitivity of investment
relative to output.
Our results indicate that bank behaviour is a major source of variation in the transmission
mechanism of monetary policy. Whereas bank lending spreads significantly decrease initially
after a monetary policy shock in most economies national investment sensitivities appear to
be only marginally different from output elasticities. National output elasticities furthermore
appear to be not statistically different from EA output elasticities. This seems to imply
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Notes: Response of ∆yi,t −∆yea,t to a one s.d. deviation (30 Basis Points) increase in the
Euroibor3M rate. The dashed lines are upper and lower bounds of the 95% bootstrapped confidence
interval.
Source: own calculations.
Figure 3.5: Deviation of national GDP growth from EA GDP growth
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Notes: Response of ∆ii,t−∆yi,t to a one s.d. deviation (30 Basis Points) increase in the Euroibor3M
rate. The dashed lines are upper and lower bounds of the 95% bootstrapped confidence interval.
Source: own calculations.
Figure 3.6: Deviation of national investment growth from national GDP growth
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Source: own calculations.
Figure 3.7: Correlation of initial interest pass-through and credit/GDP change (1999 - 2007)
that different bank behaviour could be an explanation for the divergence of credit to GDP
ratios after the introduction of the common currency. Figure 3.7 plots the change in credit to
GDP ratios against the initial spread between bank lending and interbank interest rates. We
can observe a negative correlation between the immediate pass-through of monetary policy
impulses and the change in the credit to GDP ratio. This implies that the lower the degree
of interest rate pass-through, the higher the change in the credit to GDP ratio. This suggests
that bank behaviour might have been a major driver in diverging credit to GDP ratios.
3.6 Conclusions
In this article we set up an empirical framework to disentangle bank behaviour and investment
behaviour in the credit channel of monetary policy transmission in small EA members. We
estimated the model for the period 1999:1 - 2009:4 and tested whether the transmission of
monetary policy impulses to small EA members is different.
Even though common shocks such as EA aggregate demand and monetary policy shocks
appear to be a major source of variation for investment and bank lending activities, country
specific information embodied in the variation in national variable still plays a role. This
applies especially to bank behaviour.
Monetary policy appears to be transmitted at different speeds as well as to different de-
grees through the banking sector. For most five out of six economies we find that initially
banks do not pass-through interest rate changes induced by the central bank instantaneously.
Only Austrian banks appear to pass on interest rate impulses completely. The reaction of na-
tional GDP and national investment appears to be marginally significantly different from zero,
which suggests that differences in monetary transmission might be due to bank behaviour and
not investment behaviour. The different transmission of interest rates via national banking
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systems thus appears to explain part of the divergence in the evolution of credit to GDP
ratios observed since the introduction of the euro. This underlines the importance of banks
for the transmission of monetary policy impulses highlighted in studies on the credit channel
of monetary policy.
83
Appendix
Data
Variable Name Computation Source
yea,t EA real GDP ln (real GDP) OECD EO1
piea,t EA inflation ln(hicpt/hicpt−1) OECD EO1
recb,t EA money market rate EURIBOR3M Eurostat
yi,t Country real GDP ln (real GDP) OECD EO1
rsm,t Country stock market return ln(smit−1/smit−1)3 TD2
ii,t Country real investment ln(rgfcf4) OECD EO1
1 OECD economic outlook database;
2 Thompson Reuters Datastream
3 stock market index
4 real gross fixed capital formation
Table 3.2: Data
lending rates
Country Variable Continued with changes of Source
Austria rl1,at - OENB*
rl2,at - OENB*
Belgium rl1,be pcn from 2008:2 IFS
rl2,be average of lending rates from 2008:2 IFS
Finland rl1,fi pcn from 2003:3 IFS
rl2,fi average of lending rates from 2003:3 IFS
Ireland rl1,ire phm from 2006:3 IFS
rl2,ire average of lending rates from 2006:3 IFS
Netherlands rl,nl IFS
Portugal rl1,pt T-bond 2000:2 - 2002:4 and pcn from 2003:2 IFS
rl2,pt T-bond 2000:2 - 2002:4 and average of IFS
lending rates from 2003:2
* Austrian National Bank
Table 3.3: Lending Rate Data
Lag lengths for the EA were selected using the EA submodel (first three equations) of the
main model specified in equation system (3.1). The maximum possible lag length was chosen
to be four. For the country submodels we searched up to two lags using only equations 4 - 7 in
the system. This is due to the relatively low degrees of freedom using only 48 observation and
the relatively large number of parameters in the stock market returns equation. We selected
the optimal lag length of the unrestricted reduced form of this SVAR using AIC. Results are
provided in table 3.6.
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AIC SIC searched
up to lags
EA 3 1 4
Austria 2 1 2
Belgium 2 1 2
Finland 1 1 2
Ireland 2 1 2
Netherlands 2 1 2
Portugal 2 1 2
Source: own estimation.
Table 3.4: Lag Selection by AIC and SIC
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Results
(a) Response of yea,t to ν1 (b) Response of yea,t to ν2 (c) Response of yea,t to ν3
(d) Response of ∆piea,t to ν1 (e) Response of ∆piea,t to ν2 (f) Response of ∆piea,t to ν3
(g) Response of recb,t to ν1 (h) Response of recb,t to ν2 (i) Response of recb,t to ν3
Notes: The first column displays the response of all variables to a one s.d. ν1 shock. The second (third)
column displays the reaction of all variables to a one s.d. ν2 (ν3) shock. The dashed lines are upper and lower
bounds of the 95% bootstrapped confidence interval.
Source: own calculations.
Figure 3.8: Impulse Responses graphs of the EA submodel
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Abstract
The introduction of the euro represented a major change in the monetary policy regime of several
European economies in the last decade. Such a change induces changes in agents’ behaviour. Thus
there are two major questions: How quickly do agents in these economies adapt to the new policy
regime, and, related to the first question, do people in a common monetary currency area behave
similarly once the common currency area is established? This thesis tries to provide answers to both
questions using the introduction of the common currency as a natural experiment.
The first essay studies the effects of monetary policy in individual EMU member states in the first
decade of the euro. Using SVAR country models for the sample starting in 1999Q1, we find a relatively
homogeneous transmission of monetary policy to output, despite some adjustment mechanisms in some
member countries. The reaction to external shocks appears to be homogeneous for the euro area and
its member states in the first decade after the introduction of the common currency. Shocks to large
EMU members’ inflation rates might cause some concern for ECB monetary policy makers’ target of a
stable price level. The second essay highlights the importance of financial structure for the transmission
of monetary policy impulses. For this purpose a model is estimated on the basis of which measures
for the strength of monetary policy in the individual member states are calculated. Using this model,
differences in monetary policy transmission between the EU-15 countries are investigated. We find
that banks in economies with similar financial structure have similar reaction functions to monetary
policy. We find evidence of a convergence of the monetary policy transmission mechanisms in Europe,
which is stronger in economies with similar financial structures.
Despite a common monetary policy we can observe a different evolution of credit volumes between
economies in the euro area in the first decade of the euro, as proxied by the credit to GDP ratio. As the
monetary policy regime is the same, the third essay investigates whether these different developments
are driven by credit supply or demand effects. We present a framework to disentangle credit supply and
demand effects in the monetary transmission mechanism. We use our results to explain the evolution
of credit volumes in individual member economies. We find that different bank behaviour in economies
of the EA can explain part of the diverging evolution of credit volumes in the first decade of the euro.
Overall, even though short run effects of monetary policy appear to be similar in EA member
economies, differences in the financial structure of EA member economies matter in the medium
term. The second essay emphasises that banks in economies with a similar financial structure transmit
monetary policy impulses similarly, in contrast to banks in economies with different financial structures.
The third essay argues that because contractionary monetary policy impulses are not passed-through
completely through the banking system in smaller EA member economies, credit growth is higher in
these economies, which might lead to asymmetric medium term effects of the common monetary policy
in these economies.
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Zusammenfassung
Die Einfu¨hrung des Euro stellt eine wesentliche A¨nderung der geldpolitischen Rahmenbedingungen
einer Anzahl europa¨ischer O¨konomien dar. Dies bewirkt eine Vera¨nderung des Verhaltens von Wirt-
schaftssubjekten. Daraus ergeben sich zwei Fragen: Wie rasch passen sich Wirtschaftssubjekte in
diesen La¨ndern an das neue geldpolitische Regime an und, damit verbunden, fu¨hrt die gemeinsame
Geldpolitik zu einer Homogenisierung der Reaktion der Wirtschaftssubjekte auf die Geldpolitik? Die
vorliegende Arbeit versucht Antworten auf beide Fragen zu geben.
Der erste Aufsatz untersucht die Effekte der Geldpolitik in den einzelnen Volkswirtschaften des
Euroraums im ersten Jahrzehnt der Gemeinschaftswa¨hrung. Die auf den SVAR La¨ndermodellen
beruhenden Impuls-Antwort-Funktionen deuten auf eine weitgehende Homogenita¨t der U¨bertragung
geldpolitischer Impulse zum Bruttoinlandsprodukt hin, obgleich in einigen La¨ndern noch Anpas-
sungsprozesse festgestellt werden ko¨nnen. Bei der Reaktion der Outputlu¨cke und der Inflation auf
exogene Shocks ko¨nnen keine wesentlichen Unterschiede in den einzelnen La¨ndern festgestellt werden.
La¨nderspezifische Inflationsshocks in großen Euroraum-Volkswirtschaften du¨rften jedoch problematisch
in Hinblick auf das EZB Ziel eines stabilen Preisniveaus sein.
Der zweite Aufsatz beleuchtet die Bedeutung der Finanzstruktur von Volkswirtschaften fu¨r die
U¨bertragung geldpolitischer Impulse na¨her. Anhand des empirischen Modells kann die Sta¨rke der
geldpolitischen Transmission durch das Bankensystem in einzelnen EU-15 Staaten berechnet werden.
Somit ko¨nnen mo¨gliche Asymmetrien der U¨bertragung geldpolitischer Impulse zwischen EU-15 Staaten
analysiert werden. Im Allgemeinen kann beobachtet werden, dass Banken in O¨konomien mit a¨hnlicher
Finanzstruktur gleich auf die Geldpolitik ihrer Zentralbanken reagieren. Außerdem bestehen An-
zeichen einer Konvergenz des geldpolitischen Transmissionsmechanismus, die sta¨rker in O¨konomien
mit a¨hnlicher Finanzstruktur ist.
Trotz einer gemeinsamen Geldpolitik konnte in den ersten zehn Jahren des Euro eine stark unter-
schiedliche Entwicklung bei den Kreditvolumina in Euroraum-O¨konomien beobachtet werden. Da sich
das geldpolitische Regime nicht zwischen den einzelnen Mitgliedsstaaten unterscheidet, geht der dritte
Aufsatz der Frage nach, ob diese unterschiedliche Entwicklung auf nachfrageseitige oder angebotsseit-
ige Faktoren in den einzelnen Kreditma¨rkten zuru¨ckzufu¨hren ist. Es wird ein analytischer Rahmen
vorgestellt, der es erlaubt, diese im geldpolitischen Transmissionsmechanismus zu trennen. Die Ergeb-
nisse dieses Aufsatzes deuten daraufhin, dass die unterschiedlichen Entwicklungen in den einzelnen
O¨konomien des Euroraums vor allem durch angebotsseitige Kreditmarkteffekte erkla¨rt werden ko¨nnen.
Unterschiedliche Reaktionen von Banken in den Euroraum-O¨konomien scheinen fu¨r unterschiedliche
Entwicklungen der Kreditvolumina verantwortlich zu sein.
Insgesamt betrachtet du¨rften die kurzfristigen Effekte der gemeinsamen Geldpolitik in Euroraum
Mitgliedsstaaten bereits in den ersten zehn Jahren sehr a¨hnlich sein, Differenzen in den Finanzstruktur
von O¨konomien du¨rften jedoch in der mittleren Frist Unterschiede in der geldpolitischen Transmission
bedingen. Der zweite Aufsatz betont, dass Banken in O¨konomien mit a¨hnlicher Finanzstruktur geld-
politische Impulse a¨hnlich weitergeben - im Gegensatz zu Banken in O¨konomien mit unterschiedlicher
Finanzstruktur. Der dritte Aufsatz zeigt, dass Banken kontraktiona¨re geldpolitische Impulse kurzfristig
nicht ga¨nzlich weitergeben und es somit zu einem unterschiedlichem Kreditwachstum in den kleineren
Mitgliedsstaaten des Euroraums kommen kann, was mittelfristig auf asymmetrische Effekte der Geld-
politik im Euroraum hindeutet.
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